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SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the implications of social security in a dynastic family model 
with altruistic bequest and endogenous fertility.  
The first chapter focuses on the optimal scale of pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social 
security in a dynastic family model with human capital externalities, fertility, bequest 
and endogenous growth. If the taste for the number of children is sufficiently weak 
relative to the taste for the welfare of children, social security can be welfare 
enhancing by reducing fertility and raising human capital investment per child.  
The second chapter explores the optimal PAYG social security and education 
subsidization in a dynastic family model with two types of capital, endogenous 
fertility and positive spillovers from average human capital. Such spillovers reduce 
the private return on human capital investment relative to the return on having an 
additional child, thereby leading to under-investment in human capital and over-
reproduction of population. This chapter shows that social security and education 
subsidization together can fully eliminate such efficiency losses and achieve the 
socially optimal allocation under plausible conditions. But none of them can do so 
alone. 
Since rising life expectancy has created financial pressure on maintaining a 
balanced budget for PAYG social security programs in many countries, the last 
chapter considers life expectancy as an endogenous variable. This chapter 
investigates long-run optimal tax rates of PAYG social security and public health and 
explores how they affect fertility, life expectancy, capital intensity, output per worker 
and welfare in a dynastic model with altruistic bequests and endogenous fertility. If 
  vi 
the taste for the number of children is weaker but sufficiently close or equal to that for 
the welfare of children, social security and public health can reduce fertility and raise 
life expectancy, capital intensity and output per worker. The simulation results show 
that social security and public health can be welfare enhancing by reducing fertility 
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CHAPTER 1 
Optimal social security in a dynastic model with human capital externalities, 
fertility and endogenous growth 
 
1.1. Introduction 
In this paper we investigate the implication of human capital externalities for optimal 
pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security in a dynastic family model with two types of 
capital and with endogenous fertility. Human capital accumulation has been 
recognized as a key factor for earnings; see, e.g., some related studies in the survey 
article of Lemieux (2006). Yet, the outcome of human capital accumulation for 
children is under the influence of parental factors as well as social factors outside 
their families (i.e. external to families). According to empirical evidence by Solon 
(1999), about half of children’s earnings are correlated with their parental earnings. 
This evidence suggests that non-parental factors or human capital externalities may 
be quantitatively substantial in the formation of one’s human capital. Indeed, some 
empirical studies find evidence on human capital externalities in the determination of 
individuals’ earnings through channels such as ethnic groups, neighborhoods, work 
places, or state funding of schools; see, e.g., Borjas (1992, 1994, 1995), Rauch (1993), 
Davies (2002) and Moretti (2004a, 2004b). For example, according to the studies of 
Borjas, the earnings of children are affected significantly not only by the earnings of 
their parents, but also by the mean earnings of the ethnic group in the parents’ 
generation through ethnic neighborhoods in the United States. Also, Moretti (2004b) 
finds evidence on the effects of human capital externalities on individuals’ earnings in 
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manufacturing establishments across cities in the Unites States with different levels of 
human capital. The existence of human capital externalities found in the literature 
implies that the private rate of return to human capital investment should be lower 
than the social rate of return. This tends to engender underinvestment in human 
capital and thus may have strong policy implications for optimal social security. 
  As important family decisions according to the well known trade-off between 
the quality and quantity of children in Becker and Lewis (1973), human capital 
investment and fertility have been found to be responsive to social security and thus 
serve as channels through which social security affects economic growth and 
population growth in Zhang (1995). Using cross-country data for the period 1960-
2000, Zhang and Zhang (2004) investigate the effect of social security on growth and 
growth determinants (savings, human capital investment, and fertility). 1  Their 
empirical analysis allows for feedback from growth to social security and treats 
growth, fertility, human capital investment and savings as endogenous variables using 
the IV estimation method. They also allow for country-specific fixed effects in a 
panel regression. They show that the ratio of social security benefits to GDP has a 
positive effect on human capital investment and a negative effect on fertility, as 
suggested in Figures 1.1 and 1.2 that plot secondary school enrolment and fertility 
respectively against the ratio of social security benefits to GDP in 70 countries of 
market economies. It is thus interesting to extend this line of research to explore the 
                                                 
1 Their data for social security benefits under statutory schemes are from the International Labor Office 
(ILO, various years); secondary school enrollment ratios and adult populations’ education attainment, 
used as proxies for human capital investment and human capital stock respectively, are from 
UNESCO; GDP, consumption and saving are based on the Penn World Table by Summers and Heston 
(1988) and Heston, Summers and Aten (2002); government education, government consumption, 
government transfers, population, fertility net of child mortality, revolutions, coups and assassinations 
are from Barro and Lee (1994) and the United Nations’ Demographic Yearbook (various years). 
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welfare implication and the optimal scale of social security in a dynastic family 
model with both human capital and fertility. This task is highly relevant today when 
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 While most studies on social security focus on its implication for capital 
accumulation, few have paid close attention to its welfare implication. Among them, 
Cooley and Soares (1999) have used a majority voting mechanism to justify why 
social security receives a majority support once it is already in place, although their 
model does not explain why it was instituted in the first place. Also, Zhang and 
Zhang (2007) have considered optimal social security with investment externalities in 
the final production sector in an extended neoclassical growth model without 
sustainable growth. However, having ignored human capital accumulation, these 
models do not capture the interaction between social security on the one hand and the 
trade-off between the quality and quantity of children on the other.  
  The inclusion of human capital investment can be highly relevant in the 
analysis of optimal social security. On the one hand, the payroll tax for social security 
reduces the after-tax wage rate or the after-tax rate of return on human capital 
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investment, thereby tending to reduce human capital investment. Thus, considering 
human capital investment in the analysis may make it more likely for social security 
to reduce welfare. On the other hand, when social security reduces fertility, human 
capital investment per child may rise via the trade-off between the quantity and 
quality of children. Because of these opposing forces, social security may engender a 
welfare gain only when the human capital externality causes fertility to be above its 
first-best level and causes human capital investment per child to be below its first-
best level. If social security does improve welfare, it is also interesting in theory and 
relevant in practice to gauge the size of the optimal social security tax rate 
numerically for plausible parameterizations and compare it to the observed social 
security payroll tax rates in the real world. 
  The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section introduces the 
model. Sections 1.3 and 1.4 determine the equilibrium solution and derive the results. 
Section 1.5 concludes.  
 
1.2. The model 
The model is an extension of Zhang and Zhang (2007) to incorporate human capital 
accumulation and to explore the welfare implication of social security with an 
externality in the form of spillovers of average human capital to all children’s 
learning. This extension departs from the neoclassical growth model toward an 
endogenous growth model. The model economy is inhabited by overlapping 
generations of a large number of identical agents who live for three periods. In their 
first period of life, they embody human capital and do not make any decision. In their 
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second period of life, they work and make decisions on life-cycle savings and on the 
number and education of identical children. In their third period of life, they retire and 
decide only on the allocation between the amount of bequests to children and their 
own old-age consumption. The mass of the working generation in period t is denoted 
by tL . 
  The preferences of the coexisting old parent and young working members in a 
family are assumed to be identical, defined over the consumption levels of the old and 
young members, toC , and tyC ,  respectively, and the number of children tN  of family 








t NCCVU     
where  is the discounting factor. 2  The period-utility function 
),( ,,, ttyto NCCV captures what contributes to family members’ welfare within a period: 
the consumption of coexisting old and young members as well as the number of 
children. The old-age consumption of a period-t young member will be reflected in 
),( 11,,1,  ttyto NCCV next period. In this way, we can incorporate the life-cycle 
consumption-saving consideration into a dynastic family model along with the trade-
off between the welfare and the number of children in a recursive manner. We 
assume that the period-utility function ),,( V is increasing and concave and meets the 
                                                 
2 There are various assumptions on preferences in the overlapping-generations models dealing with the 
demographic changes in the economy. Becker and Barro (1988) assume dynastic preferences where the 
discount factor is a function of the number of children. However, that assumption may not lead to 
analytical solutions with two types of capital. To obtain analytical solutions, we assume that  is 
independent of the number of children as in Lapan and Enders (1990) and Zhang (1995).  
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Inada conditions to ensure an interior optimal solution: 0/  xV as x for 
,o yx C C ; and  xV / as 0x for NCCx yo ,, .  
  The utility function in our model allows coexisting old and young members in 
the same family to value each other's consumption, in addition to their appreciation of 
the number of children and future generations' welfare in their family. In the 
conventional dynastic family model, by contrast, there is just one period in adulthood 
in which parents value the future consumption of children but not vise versa 
(downward altruism), since parental consumption would have become sunk when 
children grow up and make their own decisions. When young and old adults coexist 
and choose consumption in the same period in a family, however, the conventional 
assumption would rule out possible altruism from working family members toward 
their parents' old-age consumption and hence would create generational conflicts. In 
this sense, our approach here complements approaches featuring generational 
conflicts between coexisting old and working agents in conventional dynastic family 
models with only downward altruism as well as in conventional life-cycle models 
without any form of altruism. Further, our use of a dynastic family model, rather than 
a simple non-altruistic life-cycle model, is partly based on evidence in Zhang and 
Zhang (2004) that social security has an insignificant effect on private savings.3  
  However, the literature on the existence and on the form of altruism is divided 
in theory as well as in empirical evidence. On the one hand, empirical studies 
supporting the altruistic model include Tomes (1981), Laitner and Juster (1996), and 
                                                 
3 A dynastic family model and a life cycle model have very different implications concerning how 
PAYG social security affects private savings rates. As is well known in the literature, the effect of 
social security on savings is neutral in the former model (e.g., Barro, 1974) but negative in the latter 
(e.g., Feldstein, 1974).   
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Laitner and Ohlsson (2001), among others. For example, the empirical studies of 
Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) show that the bequest behavior in Sweden and the U.S. 
offers support for the altruistic model. On the other hand, Altonji, Hayashi and 
Kotlikoff (1997) and Horioka (2002), among others, cast doubt on the hypothesis that 
altruism motivates intergenerational transfers. According to Horioka, the selfish life-
cycle model is dominant both in the United States and Japan. These empirical studies 
use data in developed countries whereby the presence of social security and welfare 
systems might have weakened interactions among generations within families that are 
needed for detecting altruism. In particular, the traditional role of children in 
supporting old parents may no longer be necessary in these countries. By contrast, 
Raut and Tran (2005) use a sample of 7128 households from the Indonesian Family 
Life Survey (IFLS) data set in a developing country and find supporting evidence for 
the two-sided altruism model. Their estimated difference in the transfer-income 
derivatives between parents and children in the Indonesian data set is as high as 0.956, 
which is close to 1 as implied by altruistic models of intergenerational transfers and is 
much higher than an estimated counterpart 0.13 in Altonji et al. (1997) based on the 
US data set. Overall, our use of a dynastic model with two-sided altruism is consistent 
with some of the existing empirical evidence in a divided body of the related 
literature.   
  For tractability, we assume )ln(lnln),,( ,,,, ttytottyto NCCNCCV   . 
Here, (0,1)  is the taste for utility derived from the consumption of the old parent, 
(0,1)  is the taste for utility from the young-age consumption and the number of 
children of each working member, and 0  is the taste for utility from the number 
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of children relative to that from young-age consumption. If we equally value 
consumption undertaken by each of coexisting old and working members in a family 
in their identical utility function, then the values of  and  may depend on the 
relative length of working-age versus old-age lifetime. Since in reality the working 
period is longer than the retirement period,  may be greater than . We rewrite the 
utility function as 
     0 , ,
0
[ ln (ln ln )], 0 , 1, 0.t o t y t t
t
U C C N      

                        (1.1) 
For an initial old agent in period 0 who had chosen 1N children, the only remaining 
decision is the trade-off between his or her own old-age consumption ,0oC and the 
amount of bequests to children 0B .  
 Some observers may regard “upward” altruism in equation (1.1) as a more 
indirect phenomenon and “downward” altruism as a more direct one. However, 
assuming a preference with downward altruism and without upward altruism for the 
welfare assessment of social security would ignore the rise in utility for the initial old 
generation who receives social security benefits. In fact, the preference in (1.1) can be 
interpreted as a government objective assigning different weights ( , )  , such that 
1   , to utilities derived from old-age consumption of an elderly ,0ln oC  and 
from a worker who has downward altruism 
 0 , , 10 ln ln lnt y t o t ttW C C N      . According to this alternative 
interpretation, we can rewrite (1.1) as 0 ,0 0ln oU C W   that captures the 
consequences of social security on the welfare of coexisting elderly and working 
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members with downward altruism in individuals’ preferences. We will elaborate 
more on this alternative interpretation later. 
  Each young adult devotes one unit of time endowment to rearing children and 
working. Rearing a child requires v units of time, implying an upper bound 1/v on N; 
otherwise N may approach infinity. The amount of working time per worker is equal 
to 1-vN that earns (1 )(1 )t t t tvN W H  where W is the wage rate per unit of effective 
labor, tH is his or her human capital, and  is the (payroll) tax rate for social security 
contributions. A young adult in period t  also receives a bequest tB  from his or her 
old parent.4 He or she spends the earnings and the received bequest on young-age 
consumption ,y tC , retirement savings tS , and education for each child tE . An old agent 
spends part of his or her savings plus interest income and social security benefits on 
own consumption and leaves the rest as bequests to children. The budget constraints 
can be written as: 
    , (1 )(1 )y t t t t t t t t tC B vN W H S E N      ,                                                (1.2)    
      , 1 1 1 1o t t t t t tC S R T B N      ,                                                                         (1.3) 
where R is the interest factor and T the amount of social security benefits per retiree.  
  As practiced in many countries such as France and Germany, the amount of 
social security benefits received by a retiree depends on his or her own earnings in 
                                                 
4 Intentional bequests made by parents can be in the forms of inter vivos gifts and post-mortem 
bequests. Bequests in this model are of the inter vivos form which is consistent with the empirical 
evidence (i.e., Gale and Scholz, 1994) that suggests inter vivos are substantial. However, we expect 
both forms of inter vivos and post-mortem bequests to yield similar qualitative result concerning the 
effect of social security on the bequests cost of a child. This is because when parents value their 
children’s welfare, a rise in the social security tax rate would increase the amount of intentional 
bequests to offset the increased tax burden on their children, regardless of whether the bequests are 
made in the form of inter vivos or post-mortem bequests.  
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working age according to a replacement rate t , that is, 1 1 1(1 )t t t t tT vN W H     .5 
With this formula linking the amount of one’s social security benefits to his or her 
own past earnings, a worker who has more children (hence less labor time) will not 
only earn less wage income today, but also receive less social security benefits in old 
age. The social security program is assumed to be always balanced in a typical PAYG 
fashion: 1 (1 )t t t t t tT N vN W H  , whereby the bar above a variable indicates its 
average level in the economy. With identical agents in the same generation, in 
equilibrium we have N N and H H by symmetry.  
  The production of the single final good is 
      1[ (1 ) ] , 0, 0 1,t t t t tY DK L vN H D
                                                       (1.4) 
where tK is the aggregate stock of physical capital and tL is the total number of 
workers. Since one period in this model corresponds to about 30 years, it is 
reasonable to assume that both physical capital and human capital depreciate fully 
within one period. This assumption will greatly help us obtain reduced form solutions. 
  The education of a child, 1tH  , depends on the investment of the final good 
per child, tE , the human capital of his or her parent, tH , and the average human 
capital in the economy, tH : 
      1 11 ( ) , 0, 0 1, 0 1.t t t tH AE H H A
                                                  (1.5) 
                                                 
5 The essence of the results will remain valid if the amount of social security benefits is less than 
proportional to individuals’ own earnings (as in the United States) or is independent of individuals’ 
own earnings, though quantitatively different. As shown in Zhang and Zhang (2003), the more heavily 
the social security benefits depend on one’s own past earnings, the more likely the increase in the 
social security payroll tax rate will have a negative effect on fertility and a positive effect on the 
growth rate of per capita output. 
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When 1  , there is no externality from average human capital in this model. 
However, when 1  , the externality takes the form of positive spillovers from 
average human capital to the formation of human capital of every child. The 
assumption concerning the existence of positive externalities in the production of 
human capital is consistent with the empirical evidence on human capital externalities 
in the literature that we mentioned earlier.6  
  Factors are paid by their marginal products; and the price of the sole final 
good is normalized to unity. The wage rate per unit of effective labor and the real 
interest factor are then given by  
        (1 ) ,t tW D
                                                                                                (1.6) 
       1t tR D
   ,                                                                                                   (1.7) 
where /[ (1 ) ]t t t t tK L vN H   is the physical capital-effective labor ratio. The 
physical capital market clears when  
      1t t tK L S  .                                                                                                      (1.8) 
The working population evolves according to 1t t tL L N  . 
 
1.3. The equilibrium and results 
                                                 
6 Human capital externalities on individuals’ earnings may arise in the production of human capital as 
in Tamura (1991) and in the production of goods as in Lucas (1988). In fact, many related empirical 
studies such as Moretti (2004a, 2004b) focus on human capital externalities in the production of goods 
by following the formulation in Lucas (1988); some empirical studies such as Borjas (1992, 1995) 
focus on human capital externalities from the parents’ generation to the formation of children’s skills 
as in our model. However, both forms of human capital externalities share the same essence that the 
average or aggregate level of human capital has a positive spillover on each individual’s earnings. As a 
result, they should lead to the same problem of underinvestment in human capital. Therefore, assuming 
human capital externalities either in the production of goods or in the production of human capital is 
expected to yield similar results concerning optimal social security. For ease of exposition, we only 
focus on the latter in this paper.  
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We now solve the dynastic family’s problem, track down the equilibrium allocation, 
and derive the solution for the welfare level for our welfare analysis of social security 
in Section 1.4. 
 
1.3.1. Equilibrium solution for the dynastic family problem 
The problem of a dynastic family is to maximize utility in (1.1) subject to budget 
constraints (1.2) and (1.3), the education technology (1.5) and the earning dependent 
benefit formula, taking the social security tax and replacement rates as given.  This 
problem can be rewritten as the following: 
  
1
1 1 1 1 1
, , , 0
1/ 1/
1
(1 ) / (1 )(1 ) /
{ ln[ (1 ) ]max
ln[ (1 )(1 )
] ln }
t t t t
t
t t t t t t t t
B N S H t
t t t t t t t t
t t t
S R vN W H B N
B vN W H S N H A
H H N
 










    
   




where we have used the budget constraints, the earning dependent benefit formula 
and the education technology for substitution. For t ≥ 0, the first-order conditions are 




y t o t
NB
C C









 ,                                                                                       (1.10) 
 1 1
, , 1 , 1
(1 ): t t t t t t t tt
y t o t o t t
vW H E vW H BN
C C C N
     
 
     ,                                  (1.11) 
                                                 
7 Note that the transversality conditions are satisfied in this model because the Bellman equation of this 
maximization problem meets Blackwell’s sufficient conditions to be a contraction with 1  . 
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 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 11
, 1 , 2 , 1 1
(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ): t t t t t t t tt
y t o t y t t
vN W vN W N EH
C C C H
     

       

   
              





C H  .                                                                                      (1.12) 
It is easy to verify that the preference with downward altruism and without upward 
altruism should lead to the same first-order conditions as those listed above. The only 
difference is that (1.9) is derived by an elderly at the beginning of period t while the 
other first-order conditions are derived by a worker in period t when the altruism is 
downward only in the form  0 , , 10 ln ln lnt y t o t ttW C C N      . Thus, the 
equilibrium solution for allocations of time and output and for fertility must be the 
same regardless of whether the preference has only downward altruism or has both 
upward and downward altruism as in (1.1).  
In (1.9), the marginal loss in the old parent’s utility from giving a bequest to 
each child is equal to the marginal gain in children’s utility. In (1.10), the marginal 
loss in utility from saving is equal to the marginal gain in utility in old age through 
receiving the return to saving. In (1.11), the marginal loss in utility from having an 
additional child, through giving up a fraction of wage income and earnings-dependent 
social security benefits, leaving a bequest to this child and spending on the education 
of this child, is equal to the marginal gain in utility from enjoying the child. In (1.12), 
the marginal loss in the parent’s utility from investing an additional unit of income in 
children’s education is equal to the marginal gain in children’s utility through 
increasing their wage income and earnings-dependent social security benefits and 
making them more effective in teaching their own children. These first-order 
conditions hold for all t ≥ 0. 
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Definition. Given an initial state ( 1N , 0K , 0H ), a competitive equilibrium in the 
economy with PAYG social security is a sequence of allocations 
 , , 1 1 0, , , , , , , , , ,t y t o t t t t t t t t t tB C C K H N S T Y     and prices  0,t t tR W  such that (i) taking 
prices and the tax and replacement rates  0,t t t   as given, firms and households 
optimize and their solutions are feasible, (ii) the social security budget is balanced, 
and (iii) all markets clear with 1t t tK L S   and per worker labor being equal to1 tvN . 
 
Specifically, these equilibrium conditions correspond to the first-order 
conditions of firms and households, the budget constraints of households and the 
government, the technologies, the capital market clearing condition, and the amount 
of labor supply per worker equal to1 tvN , for t ≥ 0. In addition, as mentioned earlier, 
we have X X for , ,X K N H  in equilibrium by symmetry. Moreover, with the 
log utility, the Cobb-Douglas functions for both the education and the production 
technologies and the full depreciation of capital within one period, we expect the 
proportional allocations of time and output and the tax/replacement rates of social 
security to be constant over time, given any initial state.  
Letting the fraction of output per worker spent on item tX be a time-invariant 
lower-case variable /t tx X y where /t t ty Y L , we transform the variables in the 
budget constraints and first-order conditions into their relative ratios to output per 
worker. The transformed budget constraints take the form: 
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(1 )(1 )yc b s eN       and ( (1 ) )oc N b      for 0t   and 
,0 1( (1 ) )oc N b      for a predetermined 1N . Similarly, the transformed first-















  ,                                                                                                 (1.15) 
 (1 )(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )y y y y
v e v b
vN c c vN c Nc N
            ,                                                (1.16) 
 
2(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
y y y y
Ne Ne
c c c c
        
 
      .                                      (1.17) 
It is worth mentioning that (1.17) can be derived by using t t tE e y , 
1 1 1(1 )t t t t tT vN W H      (through updating), (1 ) /(1 )t t t tW y vN H   and /t t tR y k . The 
left-hand side of (1.16) contains four cost components of a child. The first cost 
component is the forgone wage income of spending time rearing a child, which falls 
with the social security tax rate, other things being equal. The second cost component 
is human capital investment per child, which may rise or fall with the social security 
tax rate. The third cost component is the forgone social security benefit of spending 
time rearing a child, which rises with the tax rate through the linkage between the 
replacement rate and the tax rate under a balanced social security budget. The fourth 
cost component is the bequest cost of a child, which should rise with the social 
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security tax rate since altruistic parents are tempted to reduce the tax burdens of social 
security on their children.  
When the tax rate rises, the subsequent rise in the third cost component 
partially offsets the fall in the first cost component, and the overall time cost of 
having a child is likely to fall. Thus, there are opposing effects of a rise in the tax rate 
on fertility: the fall in the time cost of having a child tends to raise fertility, while the 
possible rises in the costs of both human capital investment per child and bequests 
tend to reduce fertility. The net effect on fertility will depend on the taste for the 
number, relative to the welfare, of children. When the taste for the welfare of every 
child,  , becomes stronger, the third and fourth cost components of a child in (1.16) 
become larger and hence it is more likely that social security reduces fertility. By 
contrast, when the taste for the number of children,  , becomes larger, the marginal 
benefit of a child becomes larger and hence it is more likely for a rise in social 
security taxes or benefits to raise fertility.  
From these equilibrium conditions, we obtain the following constant 
allocation rules: 
 [ (1 )] (1 )(1 ) (1 )[1 (1 )]
( )[1 (1 )]
b                 
             ,         (1.18) 
 [ (1 ) ]y
bc    
   ,                                                                               (1.19) 
 s  ,                                                                                                        (1.20) 
  (1 )( )[1 (1 )][1 (1 )]nn
NN
v N               ,                            (1.21) 
where the numerator of N is  
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  
  
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 )
(1 ) 1 (1 ) ( ) ,
nN             
        
           
       




    
 













 .                                                                                              (1.24) 
 Note that the above solutions for the proportional allocation 
,0( , , , , , )y o oc s b e c c and for fertility N are indeed constant over time as expected, for 
any constant tax rate. That is, the time-invariant proportional allocation solutions 
given here satisfy all the equilibrium conditions including the budget constraints, the 
first-order conditions and the market clearing conditions in all periods. Thus, they are 
valid solutions in all times on the entire equilibrium path. Also, we can easily observe 
that if nN >0 then fertility N is positive in (1.21). However, since the log utility 
function excludes corner solutions for fertility, the presence of non-convexity in the 
form of 1t tB N  or t tE N in the budget constraints (1.2) and (1.3) may lead to a 
situation in which there is no solution for fertility for some parameter values. As 
shown in Zhang et al. (2001) and Zhang (1995), the sufficient condition for the 
solution to be optimal is a sufficiently large taste parameter for the number of 
children (  ) such that an interior solution for fertility exists. Under these restrictions 
on   and  , there is a unique optimal interior solution in this model. This is 
explicitly given below: 
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Lemma 1.1. There exists a unique equilibrium interior solution ,0( , , , , , )y o oc c c e N s  if 
the taste for the number of children is strong enough such that 
 [1 (1 )][ (1 ) (1 ) ] (1 ) (1 )( )
[1 (1 )](1 ) (1 )
                 
                . 
Also, 0b  if the discount factor   is large enough and the externality 1   is weak 
enough. 
 
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A. 
Some features of the solution merit attention. First, these constant proportional 
allocation rules satisfy the equilibrium conditions for 0t  , given any initial state and 
any constant tax rate. The government budget constraint implies that for any given tax 
rate, there is a corresponding replacement rate. Second, these proportional allocation 
rules are consistent across generations, in the sense that agents in any generation will 
choose these optimal proportional allocation rules when expecting other generations 
do so, because they have the same first-order conditions and budget constraints in this 
recursive structure. As a result, these proportional allocation rules are the equilibrium 
solution on the entire equilibrium path of the economy, satisfying the equilibrium 
conditions (the first-order conditions, budget constraints and market clearing 
conditions) in all periods. These features allow us to obtain an analytical solution for 
the levels of the variables of interest in every period, starting from the initial period. 
Thus, we can analyze how social security affects the economy and what is its optimal 
scale to maximize social welfare.  
We now ask how the solution responds to a rise in the social security tax rate: 
   20
 
Lemma 1.2. A rise in the social security tax rate has a positive effect on the ratio of 
bequests per child to output per worker and on the fraction of output spent on young-
age consumption, a negative effect on the ratio of total education spending to output 
per worker, but no effect on the saving rate. Also, defining (1 ) /(1 )      , a rise 
in the tax rate reduces fertility if    , increases fertility if   , and has no 
effect on fertility if   . 
 
Proof. The first part of the lemma emerges from differentiating (1.18)-(1.20) and 
(1.22), respectively, with respect to . For the second part, we differentiate (1.21) 
with respect to  :  
sign (1 ) (1 )N    
            
which leads to the claim on how fertility responds to a tax rate change. Finally, as 
noted above,  needs to be large enough for the existence of an interior solution for 
fertility (i.e. the taste for the number of children is strong enough). Specifically, 
fertility is positive if  
[1 (1 )][ (1 ) (1 ) ] (1 ) (1 )( )
[1 (1 )](1 ) (1 )
                 
                  
at 0  , from equation (1.21). It is easy to verify that 
sign ( ) (1 )(1 ) 0        , i.e.   . As a result, there is a nonempty range 
of  for our analysis.   
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The unresponsiveness of the saving rate to social security reflects the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis in a dynastic model. Also, in such a model altruistic 
parents respond to a rise in the social security tax and benefit by giving more bequests 
to each child so as to offset the increased tax burden on future generations. These 
results are well recognized in the literature; see Barro (1974) and Zhang (1995). 
Further, when a higher social security tax rate reduces the after-tax return to human 
capital investment, young parents reduce their total education spending for their 
children as a fraction of their output. As a result, a rise in the social security tax rate 
raises the fraction of income spent on consumption. 
 However, a rise in the tax rate may reduce, increase, or have no effect on 
fertility, depending on the relative strength of the taste for the number versus the 
welfare of children ( versus ), as mentioned earlier. By Lemma 1.2, if   is small 
enough relative to , then a rise in the tax rate will reduce fertility. This negative net 
effect of social security on fertility is consistent with empirical evidence in the 
literature (e.g. Cigno and Rosati, 1992; Zhang and Zhang, 2004). 
  
1.3.2. Dynamic equilibrium path 
Most existing studies of social security focus on steady-state solutions (e.g. Zhang, 
1995; Zhang and Zhang, 2003). To fully capture the welfare impact of social security, 
we also need to track down the entire dynamic equilibrium path starting from any 
initial level of capital 0K and any predetermined fertility rate 1.N In doing so, 
substituting  1t t t ty D vN H  into the solutions for 1tH  , 1tk  and using (1.5), (1.8) 
and the solutions from (1.18) to (1.24) yields 
























     
,  (1 )    ,                                                 (1.26) 
where t is globally convergent to   because  0 < (1 )    < 1. 
Using (1.25) and (1.26) and taking log, we have 
 1ln (1 ) ln lnt t      .                                                                     (1.27) 
By solving the log-linear first-order difference equation (1.27), we have 
 0ln ln (1 ) ln
t t
t      .                                                                     (1.28) 
With the solution in (1.28), we can now solve for the log-linear first-order difference 
equation for human capital per worker: 
 0 0





                     
                      ln (1 )t A eD vN   .                                                                         (1.29) 
From the solutions in (1.28) and (1.29), we can also solve for ln ty : 
 ln ln (1 ) ln lnt t ty D vN H     .                                                            (1.30) 
Clearly, the economy converges globally toward its balanced growth path. 
 
1.3.3. Solution for the welfare level  0U   
With the full characterization of the equilibrium path of the model, we can now solve 
for the welfare level. Using the solutions for ( 0, , , , ,ys c c e b N ) and for the sequence 
 0ln ty  given an initial state ( 1 0 0, ,N k H ), we can obtain  
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       
  
 (1.31) 
where 0B  and 1B  are constants (unresponsive to time or to the social security tax), 
and ( )F  is a function of the tax rate via , ,yc e and N . Also, the constant 0B does not 
vary with the degree of the externality, whereas 1B does:  
1
(1 )ln ln
( )[1 (1 )] 1 (1 )c en
B        
                 
Where 




   , 
            2
(1 )( ) 0
(1 ) [1 (1 )]en
   
  
      . 
 
The expression of the function ( )F  is  
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( ) ln{(1 )[1 (1 )] (1 )[1 (1 )]}
ln[1 (1 )] ln(1 ) ln
ln (1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
( ) ln 1 (1 )
( ) ln 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )








       
 
      
 
        
       
         
     
         
    
         





1 (1 ) (1 )( )(1 )
ln( / ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ( ) )
(1 ) 1 (1 ) ( )





     
           
        
    
 
     
          
      





(1 )( )[1 (1 )] 0,
[1 (1 )](1 )l
    
  
       
2
[1 (1 )][ (1 ) (1 )] ( )(1 )(1 )
[1 (1 )](1 )n
           
  
             . 
The sign of n should be assumed to be positive for the following reasons. 
Differentiating ( )F  at 0  with respect to N gives rise to a solution for fertility 
(1/ ) /( )n l nN v    . This corresponds to the social planner’s solution for 
fertility which is independent of the degree of the externality 1  . In order to have a 
well defined social planner solution, we must assume 0n  , that is 
 (1 )[1 (1 )] ( )(1 )(1 )*
[1 (1 )](1 )
           
           . 
It means that the taste for the number of children should be strong enough relative to 
the taste for the welfare of children to ensure positive fertility in the social planner’s 
solution. It is easy to verify that, when 1  , *  . This is because in the 
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absence of externalities in this dynastic family model the competitive equilibrium 
solution without social security would become the same as the social planner solution. 
This is a feature of dynastic models, as opposed to conventional life-cycle models 
whose competitive equilibrium solutions are typically not Pareto optimal even in the 
absence of externalities or other frictions. 
Interestingly, even if fertility were treated as exogenous as in most studies of 
social security, a change in the tax rate would still have an impact on welfare in (1.31) 
through affecting both consumption and education spending in this dynastic family 
model, contrary to the result obtained in Barro (1974). The key reason is that a rise in 
the contribution rate for social security reduces the after-tax wage rate and hence 
reduces the fraction of income spent on human capital investment for all children. 
Thus, when fertility were treated as exogenous in the model, the welfare effect of 
social security would be negative. The main task next is to investigate how social 
security affects welfare with endogenous fertility and with human capital investment, 
and what the optimal social security tax rate should be. 
 
1.4. Welfare implications 
For comparison purposes, we begin with the case without human capital externality 
1  and then look at the case with the human capital externality 0 1  . 
 
1.4.1. Without externality from average human capital  
Absent externalities with 1  , the welfare implication of social security is given 
below: 
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Proposition 1.1. For 1   and   , the competitive equilibrium without social 
security, * 0  , is Pareto optimal.  
 
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A. 
 In the absence of the externality, Proposition 1.1 provides the condition for an 
interior solution and describes the first-best nature of the competitive solution without 
social security. The intuition is as follows. First, with or without endogenous fertility 
in this model, social security is not neutral in general because the social security 
payroll tax distorts human capital investment at the margin, as opposed to the 
Ricardian equivalence hypothesis in Barro (1974). In the absence of the externality, 
this distortion creates a departure from the first-best solution. Second, with 
endogenous fertility social security further reduces welfare by changing fertility, 
consumption and education spending from their first-best levels in the absence of the 
externality. This conclusion is in line with the traditional view against PAYG social 
security in the literature. In the rest of this section, we will see how the externality 
from average human capital can justify social security. 
 
1.4.2. With the externality from average human capital  
With the human capital externality, the competitive equilibrium solution departs from 
the social planner solution in the following ways: 
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Lemma 1.3. A stronger human capital externality (a smaller ) leads to a higher 
fertility rate and a lower fraction of income spent on human capital investment for all 
children. 
 








          
 
          
where (1 )( )[1 (1 )]d nN N           stands for the denominator of fertility 
for 0  .  In addition, from (1.22), it is clear that / 0eN    for 0  .  
 
 Lemma 1.3 points out the efficiency loss due to the human capital externality 
that reduces the private rate of return to human capital investment from the social rate 
and hence causes under-investment in human capital. Through the trade-off between 
the quality and quantity of children, it also causes over-reproduction of the population. 
Therefore, a welfare maximizing scale of social security is to reduce fertility and raise 
human capital investment to some ideal extent in this model of endogenous growth 
driven by human capital investment.  
With the externality such that 0 1  , the welfare implication of social 
security is given below: 
 
Proposition 1.2. For 0 1   and    , the optimal level of the social security 
tax rate * exists and is unique and positive if the taste for the number of children is 
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sufficiently weak relative to the taste for the welfare of children, that is, if   is close 
enough to   for a given  . 
 
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix A. 
  In the following section, we perform a quantitative assessment of the value of 
the optimal social security tax rate for plausible parameterizations to find out whether 
it can approximate the observed rates in the real world. For comparison purposes, we 
begin with a case without externality ( 1  ) and then look at cases with the 
externality ( 0 1  ). 
 
1.4.3. Numerical examples 
As mentioned earlier, it is sufficient to focus on ( )F   in dealing with the relationship 
between the welfare level 0U  and the tax rate. However, in order to fully capture how 
welfare varies with the degree of the human capital externality as well, we use 
1 ( )B F  in equation (1.31) as the measure of welfare in our numerical results. 
Concerning the parameterization, the values of parameters are either in line with 
those in the literature if any (e.g., 0.6  , 0.33  ), or they are chosen to yield 
plausible values for fertility and the fractions of income invested in both types of 
capital (e.g. 0.1v  , 0.3  , 0.27  and 0.93  ). Taking one period as 30 years, 
the value of the discounting factor at 0.6   corresponds to an annual discounting 
factor of 0.9855 as in Gomme, Kydland and Rupert (2001).  Here, a smaller share 
parameter associated with physical inputs in education ( 0.27  ) than in production 
reflects the fact that education is less physical (more human) capital intensive than 
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production. Moreover, we set D =20, 0 =2, A =10 and 0H =5, which are non-
essential for the result.  
A key parameter for the human capital externality is  . In a log linear version 
of the determination of children’s human capital or skills in equation (1.5), the 
coefficient on log average human capital in the parental generation is equal to 
(1 )(1 )   . In a similar equation, Borjas (1995) runs regressions of children’s 
skills on two variables: parental skills and the mean skills of the ethnic group of the 
parents’ generation. In doing so, he uses data sets in the United States and uses either 
education attainment or the log real wage as the proxy for skills. The estimated 
coefficient on the mean human capital or mean skills of the ethnic group in the 
parents’ generation (defined as ethnic capital therein) is 0.18 when education 
attainment is used as the proxy, and is 0.30 when the log wage is used. Applying his 
estimates to the coefficient (1 )(1 )    in our model, we have either 0.75  or 
0.6  . Note that both education attainment and real wage are only approximate 
indicators of human capital or skills. The former does not capture the quality of 
education, whereas the latter may include possible factors that are not determined in 
the production of human capital in the real world such as human capital externalities 
in the production of goods. To be more conservative on the strength of the human 
capital externality in the production of human capital, we thus regard 0.7 as the lower 
bound for  (or 0.3 as the upper bound on 1  ) and 0.7 0.85  as a plausible 
range. We will vary it gradually toward the case without any externality ( 1  ) for 
better comparisons.  
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 In Table 1.1, we report the numerical results on the optimal social security tax 
rate, fertility and human capital investment per child relative to output per worker, 
corresponding to the values of   from 1 to 0.7 in five cases. Case 1 has no externality 
( 1  ) and gives the Pareto optimal solution without social security ( 0  ). In Case 
2 through to 5, the externality is present ( 0.7 1  ).  
It is worth noticing the following results. Given any social security tax rate, 
when the externality becomes stronger from case to case in Table 1.1, fertility rises 
but human capital investment per child relative to income per worker falls because 
the externality leads to over-reproduction of the population and under-investment in 
human capital.  Also, given any degree of the externality, when the social security tax 
rate rises in each case, fertility falls but human capital investment per child relative to 
income per worker rises. These observations reflect the results in Lemmas 1.2 and 1.3. 
According to Propositions 1.1 and 1.2, social security can be welfare 
enhancing or reducing, depending on whether the externality is present. Table 1.1 
illustrates that the optimal tax rate is zero when there is no externality ( 1  ), and is 
positive when there are positive externalities ( 1  ). Also, it shows that when the 
externality becomes stronger (smaller  ), the optimal tax rate becomes higher 
accordingly. In particular, for an externality at 0.9  , the corresponding optimal 
social security contribution rate is about 9%, while for the value of  in the plausible 
range from 0.85   to 0.7   the optimal social security rate is in the range from 
12% to 22%. These high contribution rates are in line with the observed contribution 
rates for social security in many industrial nations.  
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Table 1.1 Simulation results for various levels of the externality 
Parameterization: 0.6, 0.3, 0.27, 0.93, 0.33, 0.1v           
We denote the optimal tax rate as * and highlight the highest welfare by bold fonts.   
 
Case 1. 
1   
         
* 0   
     
0.05   0.10   0.20   0.30   0.40   
1 ( )B F   -3.4412 -3.4433 -3.4510 -3.4942 -3.6246 -4.3344 
N  1.3897  1.2648 1.1307 0.8309 0.4799 0.0632 
e  0.1390 0.1496 0.1640 0.2138 0.3542 2.5664 
    
Case 2.      
0.90    0    0.05   
 
* 0.086    0.10   0.20   0.25   
1 ( )B F    -3.4518 -3.4480 -3.4471  -3.4472 -3.4605 -3.4793 
N   1.6620 1.5449 1.4452 1.4194 1.1391  0.9820 
e    0.1078  0.1137  0.1195   0.1212  0.1447  0.1642 
 
Case 3.    
0.85    0    0.05   0.10    * 0.123    0.15   0.20   
1 ( )B F   -3.4624 -3.4569 -3.4538  -3.4534 -3.4540 -3.4590 
N   1.7784  1.6646  1.5426   1.4913  1.4116  1.2705 
e   0.0972  0.1018  0.1076   0.1104  0.1151  0.1252 
       
Case 4.      
0.80    0    0.05   0.10    * 0.157    0.20   0.25   
1 ( )B F   -3.4751 -3.4683 -3.4635  -3.4613 -3.4630 -3.4699 
N   1.8841  1.7732  1.6544   1.5002  1.3895  1.2412 
e   0.0887  0.0923  0.0970   0.1043  0.1106  0.1212 
    
Case 5.    
0.70   0   0.05   0.10   0.20   * 0.217   0.25   
1 ( )B F   3.5042 -3.4959 -3.4889 -3.4808 -3.4806 -3.4816 
N  2.0687 1.9628 1.8494  1.5969  1.5418  1.4558 
e  0.0757 0.0782 0.0813  0.0902  0.0926  0.0968 
       
Note: First-best solution is the case when 1  and 0  . 
 
In Table 1.2 we examine whether the results concerning the optimal tax rate of 
social security are sensitive to variations in the parameters ( , , , , , )v     . In doing 
so, we consider variations in one parameter at a time, starting from the 
parameterization in Table 1.1. First, a higher value of the taste for the welfare of 
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children ( ) yields a higher optimal tax rate of social security and the magnitudes of 
the changes in the optimal tax rate are large. This is because the efficiency loss of the 
human capital externality is a dynamic loss through underinvestment in human capital. 
Thus, the more individuals value their children’s welfare, the greater the efficiency 
loss of the human capital externality and therefore the higher the optimal tax rate of 
social security. The variations in the taste for the welfare of children may reflect 
cultural changes over time or increases in women’s education attainment and labor 
participation rates. Second, a larger share parameter for the physical input in the 
production of human capital ( ) leads to a higher optimal tax rate of social security 
and the magnitudes of the changes in the optimal tax rate are large as well. The 
reason for this result is that this share parameter measures the role of human capital 
investment in the accumulation of human capital. That is, with a larger share 
parameter  , parental human capital investment becomes more important in the 
formation of children’s human capital and therefore the efficiency loss of the human 
capital externality is larger for a given  . Holding 0.7  and 0  , for example, if 
0.2  then the fraction of income invested in human capital per child is equal to 
4.6% and the welfare level is equal to 3.0232 , whereas if 0.27  then the fraction 
of income invested in human capital per child is equal to 7.6% and the welfare level 
is equal to 3.5042  as given in Table 1.1. Thus, the optimal tax rate should be much 
higher in the latter case than in the former (21.7% versus 16.9% according to Tables 
1.1 and 1.2). 
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Table 1.2 Simulated optimal tax rates: sensitivity analysis 
Starting from the baseline parameterization 
Parameter  =0.95  =0.9  =0.85  =0.8  =0.7 
Varying        
 =0.55 0.0252 0.0481 0.0689 0.0879 0.1213 
 =0.65 0.0590 0.1118 0.1586 0.2005 0.2726 
      
Varying        
  =0.2 0.0354 0.0673 0.0962 0.1226 0.1689 
  =0.32 0.0501 0.0956 0.1371 0.1751 0.2253 
      
Varying        
  =0.85 0.0451 0.0859 0.1229 0.1567 0.2160 
  =1 0.0437 0.0834 0.1196 0.1528 0.2116 
      
Varying        
  =0.28 0.0429 0.0819 0.1175 0.1501 0.2080 
  =0.38 0.0467 0.0889 0.1272 0.1622 0.2236 
      
Varying        
  =0.05 0.0417 0.0796 0.1142 0.1459 0.2021 
  =0.4 0.0451 0.0860 0.1232 0.1572 0.2170 
      
Varying v       
v  =0.05 0.0449 0.0856 0.1227 0.1567 0.2166 
v  =0.2 0.0449 0.0856 0.1227 0.1567 0.2166 
 
 
By contrast, variations in the other parameters produce relatively little 
changes in the optimal tax rate of social security in Table 1.2. This is because these 
parameters are less relevant for human capital investment, which channels the 
efficiency loss of the human capital externality, than ( , )  . Among these cases, the 
variations in the taste for the number of children may reflect cultural changes over 
time or government policy associated with children (e.g. child benefits). In particular, 
one may want to know whether the results for optimal PAYG social security are 
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robust when the change in this taste parameter creates significant changes in fertility 
(e.g. from the “baby boom” to the “baby bust”). To see this, we first raise the level of 
the taste for the number of children  to 1.0. Such a rise in  may reflect monetary 
incentives for having children provided in several countries (e.g. child benefits). 
Holding 0.8  , this rise in   raises fertility to 2.165 and reduces the fraction of 
investment in human capital per child to 7.7% without social security; these changes 
are significant in magnitude, compared to Case 4 of Table 1.1 at 0  . Despite the 
significant rise in fertility, the optimal tax rate for social security only declines 
slightly from 15.7% in Case 4 of Table 1.1 to 15.3% in Table 1.2. Now, we lower the 
value of the taste for the number of children to 0.85 to capture a possible reason such 
as cultural change for sharp declines in fertility since the 1970s. The result of this 
decline in  is a substantial decline in fertility to 1.537 and a rise in the fraction of 
income for human capital investment per child to 10.9% without social security. 
Again, there is only a slight rise in the optimal tax rate for social security to 15.7%. 
These substantial changes in fertility resemble what is usually called as the “baby 
boom” and the “baby bust”. However, the optimal tax rate for social security remains 
in a narrow range from 15% to 16%. It is also worth mentioning that for the value 
of   in the plausible range from 0.85   to 0.7  , the respective elasticity of 
fertility to tax rate at 5% is in the range from -0.06 to -0.07. This range of elasticity of 
fertility is close to the calibrated elasticity of fertility to tax rate at 4%, -0.09, in 
Ehrlich and Kim (2007) that use actual U.S. data from 1960-1991.  
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1.5. Conclusion 
In this paper we have examined the welfare implication of social security by 
incorporating life-cycle savings, bequests, human capital investment and fertility in a 
dynastic family model. In achieving this, we have overcome difficulties in tracking 
down the entire equilibrium path of capital accumulation and deriving an explicit 
solution for the welfare level with both human and physical capital. We have shown 
analytically that scaling up PAYG social security improves welfare when there are 
externalities under the same condition it reduces fertility and raises capital intensity, 
until reaching an optimal tax rate. Quantitatively, for an externality in the range of 
 from 0.85   to 0.7  , our model can generate optimal social security 
contribution rates in a range of 12%-22%. This is very much in line with the actual 
range of the contribution rates in many industrial countries.  
In terms of the underlying driving forces, our results hinge on assumptions of 
altruistic intergenerational transfers, human capital spillovers and endogenous fertility. 
Whether the results in this paper are useful contributions depends on whether these 
assumptions are plausible. Among them, the assumption of endogenous fertility 
follows the Beckerian approach. As a necessary condition for PAYG social security 
programs to mitigate the efficiency loss of the human capital externality, the negative 
response of fertility to social security is consistent with empirical evidence in some 
existing studies such as Cigno and Rosati (1992) and Zhang and Zhang (2004). The 
human capital externality works through the trade-off between the number and the 
quality of children, implying a below optimal level of human capital investment per 
child and an above optimal level of fertility. This differs from the implication of the 
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investment externality explored in Zhang and Zhang (2007) that leads to suboptimal 
investment in physical capital and suboptimal fertility. Both types of externalities 
have received some supporting empirical evidence in the literature; their relative 
significance is an empirical task and awaits future research. If both externalities are 
present at the same time, we expect the results to remain similar qualitatively in the 
sense that they render a welfare improving role for unfunded social security. However, 
the results may differ quantitatively because of their different impacts on human 
capital accumulation, physical capital accumulation and fertility. Among these 
driving forces, the assumption of altruistic intergenerational transfers in dynastic 
families is more controversial since there are different views and evidence with 
regard to the existence or the extent of altruism among family members in different 
generations.  Though the related literature is inconclusive, some of the existing 
empirical studies have found supporting evidence for intergenerational altruism.  
Such a combination of these factors has not been used in the welfare analysis 
of social security, to the best of our knowledge. Thus, our results are complementary 
to Cooley and Soares (1999) that justifies why PAYG social security receives a 
majority support once it has already been put in place in an overlapping-generations 
model with selfish agents. Unlike their results, our model can also explain why social 
security has been instituted in many countries in the first place. While we focus on 
social security in this paper, there are other fiscal instruments that can also mitigate 
the efficiency loss of the human capital externality. These additional instruments 
include subsidies on education investment and taxes on the number of children. Since 
the competitive solution differs from the social planner’s solution in two dimensions 
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in our paper (fertility and human capital investment), using the conventional 
education subsidy alone cannot eliminate the efficiency loss of the human capital 
externality to reach the social planner allocation. Moreover, taxes on the number of 
children have hardly been practiced in the developed countries. In fact, poor families 
with many children have often been provided with financial assistance from social 
programs, which can be traced back to the early 19th century in England (see, e.g., 
Boyer, 1989).     
Population aging in the last several decades has created financial pressure on 
maintaining a balanced budget for PAYG social security programs in many countries. 
Different proposals for social security reform have emerged. Some of them aim at 
replacing pay-as-you-go social security with compulsory retirement savings in 
individual accounts. For instance, there was a failed referendum in New Zealand in 
1997 calling for establishing a compulsory individually-based retirement savings 
scheme, which was regarded as a substitute for its public pension. The policy 
implication of our analysis in this paper is a call for caution against reform plans that 
abandon pay-as-you-go social security or reduce its scale significantly. In developed 
countries, population aging has been driven by two factors: below-replacement 
fertility rates and falling mortality rates. Our present paper abstracts from the second 
factor. For population aging driven by a permanent decline in fertility (caused by 
factors other than social security), our numerical results suggest that little change in 
the optimal contribution rate for PAYG social security may be made in the presence 
of the human capital externality.  
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Indeed, many reform proposals try to keep the contribution rates at today’s 
level and only change the “design” of the pension system such as strengthening the 
funded component or weakening the intragenerational redistribution. According to 
Zhang (1995), however, an inframarginal funded pension component is neutral if the 
benefit is linked to one’s own contribution, whereas it has a positive effect on fertility 
and negative effects on human capital investment and growth if the benefit is 
independent of one’s own contribution. In either case of the relationship between 
pension benefits and contributions for an individual, the funded component is not 
useful to mitigate the efficiency loss caused by human capital externalities in this 
model. Finally, reducing intragenerational redistribution makes social security 
benefits more dependent on one’s own contribution. According to Zhang and Zhang 
(2003), this stronger linkage of benefits to contributions at an individual level makes 
it more likely for PAYG social security to raise human capital investment and the 
growth rate and reduce fertility. Therefore, reducing intragenerational redistribution is 
likely to make PAYG social security more effective in mitigating the efficiency loss 
of the human capital externality. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of Lemma 1.1. First, it is easy to verify that if    (as defined in the lemma) 
then 0nN  according to the solution for fertility in (1.21). Consequently, from (1.21) 
with 0nN  , we must have 0 1/N v  . Here, it is obvious that N>0 under    
because then the numerator of N, i.e. nN , is positive and the denominator is signed by 
the sum of two positive terms  (1 )( )[1 (1 )][1 (1 )]            and nN >0. 
These facts under    also imply 
  1(1 )( )[1 (1 )][1 (1 )]nn
NNv
N               ,  
leading to 1/N v . Note that 0yc  in (1.19) by substituting (1.18) into it. Then, 
0oc   in (1.23), ,0 0oc   in (1.24), and e >0 in (1.22). Clearly, 0s   in (1.20).  
To see the conditions for 0b   in (1.18), we define its signing part as 
 (1 )[1 (1 )]( ) [ (1 )] (1 )(1 )
1 (1 )
f              
             
Obviously, ( ) 0f    and (0) (1 )(1 ) 0f        . Also, when 1   and when 
1,  [ (1 )] (1 )(1 ) (1 ) 0.f                    As a result, if  is large 
enough and1   small enough, bequests must be positive. Note that 0b  means 
intergenerational transfers from grown up children to old parents in this model. The 
results of our paper remain qualitatively the same regardless of the direction of 
intergenerational transfers. Note also that the solution for each of these household 
variables is unique under the stated conditions. 
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  The remaining task is to argue for the optimality for any given time-invariant 
social security tax rate , leaving the optimal design of social security to a later stage. 
The optimality builds on the following facts. (i) Since the log utility excludes corner 
solutions, any solution for fertility or for consumption must be strictly positive. (ii) 
All choice variables lie in closed and bounded sets: ,0, , ,y o oc c c e  and s  are in 0,1 , 
b in [-1,1] and N  in 0,1/ v . (iii) The utility function tU is continuous in the interior 
values of the choice variables ( , , )y oc c N . (iv) The utility level tU is bounded above 
under 1   as will be clearly seen later in (1.31). By (i)-(iv), there is at least one 
optimum. From both (i) and the uniqueness of the interior solution, the optimum must 
correspond to this unique solution for any given time-invariant social security tax rate. 
    
 
Proof of Proposition 1.1. It is sufficient to focus on ( )F   in dealing with the 
equilibrium relationship between the welfare level 0 ( )U   and the tax rate. According 
to (1.31), we have 
 ( ) ( ) / ( )F G                                                                                               (1.32) 
where the denominator ( )G  is positive 
 





    
2
( ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )( ( ) )
(1 ) 1 (1 ) ( )
[1 (1 )](1 ) 1 (1 )
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
1 (1 ) ( ) 1 (1 ) (1
G        
           
        
    
          
         
      
         
     
    
        
        

)( )(1 ) ,   
 
   41
  
and the numerator ( ) is a cubic function: 
 3 23 2 1 0( ) a a a a         
with 






   
  
0 1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) ( )
1 (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
(1 ) ( )
1 (1 ) ( )(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
(1 ) (1 ) ( ) (1 ).
P        
      
        
      
     
      
         
        
   
       
    
     
      
      
 
Observe that if 1  in the expression for 0a , then 0a =0 and hence ( ) 0F    in 
equation (1.32) at 0   and 1  . In other words, for 1  , * 0   maximizes ( )F  , 
namely that, if there were no externality, the competitive solution without social 
security would be Pareto optimal.  
 
Proof of Proposition 1.2. For 0 1  , a unique optimal level of positive social 
security *  exists if there are conditions leading to (i) ( ) 0F   at 0  , 
(ii) ''( ) 0F    at * , and (iii) ( ) 0F   for  exceeding an upper limit  . See Figure 
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  Note: The welfare level refers to ( )F  . The parameterization is  
  0.8, 0.6, 0.3, 0.27, 0.93, 0.33, 0.1v             
 
From equation (1.32), the condition for (i) ( ) 0F   at 0   corresponds 
to 0a > 0. We show that 0 0a  can emerge from a sufficiently small   for a given   
under 0 1  . That is, with the externality, the optimal social security tax rate is 
positive if the taste for the number of children is sufficiently weak relative to the taste 
for the welfare of children. According to equation (1.32), the task of showing 0 0a  is 
reduced to the task of showing 0 0P  under 0 1  .  
From the expression for 0P  in equation (1.32), it can be observed that for a 
sufficiently small   relative to  , 0P < 0 and thus 0a > 0, leading to ( ) 0F   at 
0  . This is because the sign for the first term of 0P  is positive under    and the 
sign for the second term depends on the value of   relative to that of 
(1 ) / (1 )      . Specifically, the second term is positive (zero, or negative) 
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when  is greater than (equal to, or smaller than)  . Also, the first term of 0P  
approaches zero if   . Thus, when  is sufficiently small such that 
[1 (1 )][ (1 ) (1 ) ] (1 ) (1 ) ( )
[1 (1 )](1 ) (1 )
                   
               
,  
then 0P  is negative and thus 0a > 0, leading to ( ) 0F    at  0   under these 
conditions. Conversely, if  is sufficiently large such that (1 ) /(1 )        , 
then 0a < 0 and thus ( ) 0F   at  0  . Since ( )F   is a continuous function in the 
interval ( , )  , there exists a range of sufficiently small ( , )    relative to  , 
such that 0a > 0 for 0 1   and thus ( ) 0F    at 0  .  
 For a small enough ( , )   , the second-order condition is also satisfied. 
This can be seen from 
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Since the coefficient on N  on the right-hand side is positive for ( , )   , 
0N   for the same range of  . Also, since   reduces N toward zero (hence 
raises1/ N to infinity), a sufficiently small ( , )    leads to ( ) 0F   .  
 Finally, when the tax rate is already very high, a further rise in the tax rate will 
drive human capital investment down to suboptimal levels, causing ( )F  < 0. 
Combining all the arguments above together, there exists a unique optimal 
* 0   such that ( *) 0F   and ( *) 0F   under these stated conditions.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Pareto optimal social security and education subsidization in a dynastic model 
with human capital externalities, fertility and endogenous growth 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Social security and education subsidization have long been key elements of public 
policy in most countries and have received a great deal of attention in economic 
studies and public policy debates. Concerning education subsidization in practice, 
according to OECD (2008), governments of OECD countries on average spent about 
5% of GDP on education. In fact, the recognition of the role of education in 
development started at the birth of modern economics as a profession: Adam Smith in 
The Wealth of Nations discusses the importance of education in length. The recent 
endogenous growth theory also recognizes education for human capital accumulation 
as an engine of sustainable growth as shown in Lucas (1988). For instance, according 
to Azariadis and Drazen (1990), rapid growth cannot occur without a sufficiently high 
level of human capital investment relative to income; and according to Laitner (1993), 
human capital accumulation through general education adds 30% to 50% to long-run 
growth in per capita output. Moreover, Zhang (1996) finds that education 
subsidization financed by labor income taxation alleviates under-investment caused 
by human capital externalities, while Zhang and Casagrande (1998) find empirical 
evidence that education subsidies promote economic growth but have little effect on 
fertility in a cross-country data set.  
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Similarly, social security has been established in most developed countries, 
mainly in the form of a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system with payroll tax rates ranging 
from 10% to 20% or higher (see Social Security Administration and International 
Social Security Association, 2008). Its impacts on savings and economic growth have 
been examined extensively without reaching consensus in Barro (1974), Feldstein 
(1974), Hubbard and Judd (1987), Zhang (1995), Rosati (1996), Corneo and 
Marquardt (2000), Sanchez-Losada (2000), and Kemnitz and Wigger (2000), among 
others. Among them, Zhang (1995) shows that social security can promote growth by 
raising human capital investment and reducing fertility without changing the saving 
rate. Using a cross-country panel data set, Zhang and Zhang (2004) indeed find 
evidence that social security has a negative effect on fertility, positive effects on 
secondary school enrolment and economic growth, but no statistically significant 
effect on the saving rate. Also, Cooley and Soares (1999) argue that once social 
security is instituted it will be supported by a majority due to generational conflicts. 
Moreover, Zhang and Zhang (2007) and Yew and Zhang (2009) find that social 
security can improve social welfare because of spillovers from aggregate physical 
capital in a neoclassical growth model or from average human capital in an 
endogenous growth model. However, in these models social security cannot lead to 
the socially optimal allocation.     
With few exceptions, the existing literature has studied the implications of 
social security and education subsidization separately. The exceptions include 
Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), Pecchenino and Pollard (2002) and Rojas (2004). All 
these studies show that higher social security leads to lower welfare or slower growth 
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in the presence of education subsidization. In Rojas (2004), an increase in education 
subsidies is also welfare reducing.  
Differing from the previous work, in our paper social security and education 
subsidization together, rather than alone, can eliminate the efficiency losses of human 
capital externalities and achieve the socially optimal allocation when social security 
reduces fertility. Indeed, some empirical studies find evidence of human capital 
externalities in the determination of individuals' earnings through channels such as 
ethnic groups, neighborhoods, work places, or state funding of schools; see, e.g., 
Borjas (1992, 1994, 1995), Rauch (1993), Davies (2002) and Moretti (2004a,b). Such 
externalities lower the private rate of return on human capital investment from its 
social rate, and thus lead to under-investment in human capital. At the same time, via 
the well-known trade-off between the quality and quantity of children in the spirit of 
Becker and Lewis (1973), the externality also leads to over-reproduction of the 
population. The combination of too many children and too little education is indeed a 
typical phenomenon in early development, and therefore the analysis of government 
policies dealing with such efficiency losses of the human capital externality may be 
highly relevant in the real world. 
As a conventional policy instrument, education subsidization reduces the cost 
of human capital investment and hence appears to be an ideal means to tackle the 
under-investment problem. However, once fertility is optimally chosen by individuals 
as in this model, education subsidization also reduces the education cost of a child. It 
may therefore tend to increase fertility, although it may reduce fertility indirectly via 
the trade-off between the quantity and quality of children. In addition, the 
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accompanying tax on wage income weakens the positive effect of education 
subsidization on human capital investment but strengthens the positive effect of 
education subsidization on fertility by reducing the after-tax wage rate. Thus, 
education subsidization alone cannot fully eliminate the efficiency losses from human 
capital externalities once fertility is chosen optimally by individuals.  
Similarly, social security financed by payroll taxation alone cannot eliminate 
the efficiency losses from the human capital externality either, because of its 
conflicting effects on fertility and human capital investment as well. On the one hand, 
social security raises the cost of a child by raising the foregone earnings-dependent 
social security benefits for time-intensive childrearing, and by raising bequests to 
children for easing their increased tax burden. It also raises the benefit of human 
capital investment when social security benefits are earnings-dependent. However, 
the payroll tax for social security exerts opposite effects on the cost of a child and on 
the benefit of human capital investment. The net effects on fertility and on human 
capital investment are unclear and dependent on the discounting factor in preferences. 
If the net effect of social security on fertility is negative as in the empirical evidence 
in Zhang and Zhang (2004), social security and education subsidization financed by 
payroll taxation together can eliminate the under-investment and over-reproduction 
problems and achieve the socially optimal allocation. In deriving these results, we 
start with a general model for general Pareto optimal government policy rules and 
then provide an example with log utility and Cobb-Douglas technologies.   
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section 
introduces the model. Section 2.3 deals with the social planner problem. Section 2.4 
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determines the competitive equilibrium and derives the results for Pareto optimal 
social security and education subsidization in a general case. Section 2.5 illustrates 
our results in a special case with logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas technologies. 
Section 2.6 concludes.  
 
2.2. The model 
The model has an infinite number of discrete periods and overlapping-generations of 
identical agents who live for three periods. In their first period of life, they embody 
human capital and do not make any decision. In their second period of life, they work 
and make decisions on lifecycle savings and on the number and education of identical 
children. In their third period of life, they retire and decide only on the allocation 
between the amount of bequests to children and their own old-age consumption.8 The 
mass of the working generation in period t is denoted by tL . 
  The preferences of the coexisting old parent and young working members in a 
family are assumed to be identical and are defined over the consumption levels of the 
old and young members, toC , and tyC , , respectively, and the number of children tN  of 
family members in all generations as in Zhang and Zhang (2007): 
  , ,
0
( , , ), (0,1),t o t y t t
t
U C C N 

                                                  (2.1) 
                                                 
8 Intentional bequests made by parents can be in the forms of inter vivos gifts and post-mortem 
bequests. Bequests in this model are of the inter vivos form which is consistent with the empirical 
evidence (i.e., Gale and Scholz, 1994) that suggests inter vivos are substantial. However, we expect 
both forms of inter vivos and post-mortem bequests to yield similar qualitative result concerning the 
effect of social security on the bequests cost of a child. This is because when parents value their 
children’s welfare, a rise in the social security tax rate would increase the amount of intentional 
bequests to offset the increased tax burden on their children, regardless of whether the bequests are 
made in the form of inter vivos or post-mortem bequests.  
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where  is the discounting factor. 9  The period-utility function , ,( , , )o t y t tU C C N is 
defined over what can contribute to living family members’ welfare within a period: 
the consumption of coexisting old and young members as well as the number of 
children.10 The old-age consumption of a period-t young member will be reflected in 
, 1, , 1 1( , )o t y t tU C C N   next period. In this way, we can incorporate the lifecycle 
consumption-saving consideration into a dynastic family model along with the trade-
off between the welfare and the number of children in a recursive manner. We 
assume that the period-utility function ( , , )U    is increasing and concave and meets 
the Inada conditions to ensure an interior optimal solution: / 0U x   as x for 
,o yx C C ; and /U x   as 0x for NCCx yo ,, .11  
  Each young adult divides one unit of time endowment between rearing 
children and working. Rearing a child requires v fixed units of time, implying an 
upper bound 1/v on N; otherwise N may approach infinity. The amount of working 
time per worker is equal to 1-vN that earns (1 )(1 )t t t tvN W H  where W is the wage 
                                                 
9 There are various assumptions on preferences in the overlapping-generations models dealing with the 
demographic changes in the economy. Becker and Barro (1988) assume dynastic preferences where the 
discount factor is a function of the number of children. However, that assumption may not lead to 
analytical solutions with two types of capital. To obtain analytical solutions, we assume that  is 
independent of the number of children as in Lapan and Enders (1990) and Zhang (1995).  
10 When young and old adults coexist and choose consumption in the same period in a family, the 
conventional assumption would rule out possible altruism from working family members toward their 
parents' old-age consumption and hence would create generational conflicts. In this sense, our 
approach here complements approaches featuring generational conflicts between coexisting old and 
working agents in conventional dynastic family models with only downward altruism as well as in 
conventional lifecycle models without any form of altruism. Further, our use of a dynastic family 
model, rather than a non-altruistic lifecycle model, is partly based on empirical evidence in Zhang and 
Zhang (2004) that social security has a statistically insignificant effect on private savings. As is well 
known in the literature, the effect of social security on savings should be neutral in the dynastic family 
model (e.g., Barro, 1974) but negative in the lifecycle model (e.g., Feldstein, 1974). 
11The literature on the existence and on the form of altruism is divided in theory as well as in empirical 
evidence. Some empirical studies find supporting evidence for the altruistic model, e.g., Tomes (1981), 
Laitner and Juster (1996), and Laitner and Ohlsson (2001). In particular, the empirical studies of 
Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) show that the bequest behavior in Sweden and the U.S. supports the 
altruistic model. 
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rate per unit of effective labor, tH is human capital for each worker, and   is the 
labor income tax rate. A young adult in period t  also receives a bequest tB  from his 
or her old parent. He or she spends the after-tax earnings and the received bequest on 
young-age consumption ,y tC , retirement savings tS , and education for each 
child (1 )t tE , where t is the rate of education subsidies. An old agent spends part 
of his or her savings plus interest income and social security benefits on own 
consumption and leaves the rest as bequests to children. The household budget 
constraints can be written as: 
    , (1 )(1 ) (1 )y t t t t t t t t t tC B vN W H S E N        ,                                      (2.2)    
      , 1 1o t t t t t tC S R T B N    ,                                                                              (2.3) 
where R is the interest factor and T the amount of social security benefits per retiree.    
  As practiced in many countries such as France and Germany, the amount of 
social security benefits received by a retiree depends on his or her own earnings in 
working age according to a replacement rate t , that is, 1 1 1(1 )t t t t tT vN W H     .12 
With this formula linking the amount of one’s social security benefits to one's own 
past earnings, a worker who has more children (hence less labor time) will not only 
earn less wage income today, but also receive less social security benefits in old age. 
The government is assumed to run a balanced budget in every period: 
1 (1 )t t t t t t t t tT N vN W H E N       , whereby the bar above a variable indicates its 
                                                 
12 The essence of the results will remain valid if the amount of social security benefits is less than 
proportional to individuals’ own earnings (as in the United States) or is independent of individuals’ 
own earnings, though quantitatively different. As shown in Zhang and Zhang (2003), the more heavily 
the social security benefits depend on one’s own past earnings, the more likely the increase in the tax 
rate for social security will have a negative effect on fertility and a positive effect on the growth rate of 
per capita output. 
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average level in the economy. With identical agents in the same generation, in 
equilibrium we have N N and H H by symmetry.  
  The production of the single final good uses a constant-return-to-scale 
technology: 
      ( , (1 ) )t t t t tY F K L vN H                                                                                 (2.4) 
where tK is aggregate physical capital and tL is the total number of workers. Since one 
period in this model corresponds to about 30 years, it is reasonable to assume that 
both physical capital and human capital depreciate fully within one period. The 
function ( , )F   is assumed to be increasing and concave. In per worker terms ty and 
tk , we have / ( , (1 ) )t t t t t ty Y L f k vN H    and 1 1 1/t t tk K L   . 
 A constant-return-to-scale education technology is available for a child to 
embody human capital, 1tH  , depending on the parental investment of the final good 
per child, tE , parental human capital, tH , and the average human capital in the 
economy, tH , as in Tamura (1991): 
      1 ( , , )t t t tH H E H H  .                                                                                    (2.5) 
The function ( , , )H    is also assumed to be increasing and concave. Under this 
assumption, there is an externality in the form of positive spillovers from average 
human capital to the formation of human capital of every child, in line with the 
empirical evidence on human capital externalities in the literature that we mentioned 
earlier.13  
                                                 
13 Human capital externalities on individuals’ earnings may arise in the production of human capital as 
in Tamura (1991) and in the production of goods as in Lucas (1988). In fact, many related empirical 
studies such as Moretti (2004a, 2004b) focus on human capital externalities in the production of goods 
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  Assuming perfect competition, the interest factor and the before-tax wage rate 
per unit of effective labor are equal to their marginal products: 
( , (1 ) ) ,t t t tt
t t
Y f k vN HR
K k
                              (2.6)                               
( , (1 ) )
[ (1 ) ] [(1 ) ]
t t t t
t
t t t t t
Y f k vN HW
L vN H vN H
       .                                                 (2.7)                           
The price of the sole final good is normalized to unity.  
The physical capital market clears when  
      1t t tK L S  .                                                                                                      (2.8) 
The working population evolves according to 1t t tL L N  . 
 Feasibility in the economy is given below: 
, 1 1 , 1 1 1o t t t t y t t t t t t tC y N N C N N k E N N        .              (2.9) 
 
2.3. The social planner problem 
Starting from an initial state ( 1N , 0K , 0H ),  the social planner chooses a 
sequence  , 1 1 1, , , , ,y t t t t t tC N k E H H   to maximize utility in (2.1) subject to feasibility 
and technologies  in the economy as the following: 
                                                                                                                                           
by following the formulation in Lucas (1988); some empirical studies such as Borjas (1992, 1995) 
focus on human capital externalities from the parents’ generation to the formation of children’s skills 
as in our model. However, both forms of human capital externalities share the same essence that the 
average or aggregate level of human capital has a positive spillover on each individual’s earnings. As a 
result, they should lead to the same problem of underinvestment in human capital. Therefore, assuming 
human capital externalities either in the production of goods or in the production of human capital is 
expected to yield similar results concerning optimal government policy. For ease of exposition, we 
only focus on the latter in this paper.  
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 

1 1 , 1 1 1 ,
0
1
( , (1 ) ) , ,   max
[ ( , , ) ] .
t
t t t t t y t t t t t t t y t t
t
t t t t t
U f k vN H N N C N N k E N N C N




    


   
 

Here, we have used the feasibility in the economy and the production technology for 
substitution and introduced a multiplier t for the education technology. It is worth 
noting that the social planner, unlike an individual in a decentralized economy, can 
choose average human capital 1tH  . Due to the presence of the products 1t tN k  and 
t tN E , the feasible set of the choice variables in feasibility (2.9) may not be a convex 
set; that is, ,o tC and hence ( )U  may not be a concave function of variables 
( 1, ,t t tE k N ). We thus need to assume the following:                                                  
 
Assumption 2.1.  1 1 , 1 1 1 ,( , (1 ) ) , ,t t t t t y t t t t t t t y t tU f k vN H N N C N N k E N N C N        is 
 concave in , 1( , , , )y t t t tC E k N . 
 
Denote , ,( , , )t o t y t tU U C C N and  , (1 )t t t tf f k vN H  for notational ease. 
The first-order conditions are given below for t ≥ 0: 




o t y t
U UN
C C
   ,              (2.10) 
1tk  :  1 11
, , 1 1
t t t
t





     ,              (2.11) 






o tt t t t
t t t t
o t t t t o t t
CU f U UN v H k E
C vN H N C N
  

             
   (2.12) 
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tE :    11
,




      
1 1, :t tH H   
12 2 1 1
1 1
1 1 , 1 1 1
(1 )
[(1 ) ]
tt t t t
t t t t
t t o t t t
H H U f vN N
H H C vN H
       
    
             
. 
The first-order conditions with respect to tE and 1tH  or 1tH  lead to the optimal 
condition concerning human capital investment: 





1 2 2 2
1 1





o t t o t
t t t t
t t
t t tt t
U H UN
C E C
f H H HvN N
H H EvN H
  

   
 
   
     
               
        (2.13) 
 The system of equations (2.9) - (2.13) and our assumptions about the 
functions for preferences and technologies provide necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the socially optimal allocation. 14 
 
Definition 2.1. For 0t  and a given state 0 0 0 1( , , , )k H L N , a socially optimal 
allocation is a sequence  , , 1 1 1 0, , , , ,y t o t t t t t t tC C E N k H H      satisfying the 
technologies in (2.4) and (2.5), the feasibility in (2.9) and the optimal conditions in 
(2.10)-(2.13). 
 
 The main purpose of our paper is to find optimal social security and education 
subsidization that can decentralize the socially optimal allocation into a competitive 
equilibrium allocation. 
                                                 
14 Note that the transversality conditions are satisfied in this model because the Bellman equation of 
this maximization problem meets Blackwell’s sufficient conditions to be a contraction with 1  . 
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2.4. The competitive equilibrium and results 
In the decentralized economy, each consumer maximizes utility in (2.1) subject to 
budget constraints (2.2) and (2.3), the education technology (2.5) and the earnings-
dependent benefit formula, taking the rates of the income tax, the education subsidy 





by choice of 1( , , , , )t t t t tB E N H S where we have used the budget constraints and the 
earnings-dependent benefit formula for substitution. For t ≥ 0, the first-order 
conditions are given as follows: 
 1
, ,
: t tt t
o t y t
U UB N
C C




: t tt t





   ,                                                                            (2.15) 
 :tN    1 1 1
, , 1
(1 ) (1 )t t tt t t t t t t t t
t y t o t
U U Uv W H E vW H B
N C C
     

          ,(2.16) 
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The first-order conditions with respect to tE and 1tH  lead to the following optimal 
condition concerning human capital investment:  







(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
                                                 (1 )               
                                         
t t t
t t t t t

























   
 
     
        (2.17) 
 
In (2.14), the marginal loss in the old parent’s utility from giving a bequest to 
each child is equal to the marginal gain in children’s utility. In (2.15), the marginal 
loss in utility in young working age from saving is equal to the marginal gain in 
utility in old age through receiving the return to saving. In (2.16), the marginal loss in 
utility from having an additional child, through giving up a fraction of wage income 
and earnings-dependent social security benefits, leaving a bequest to this child and 
spending on the education of this child, is equal to the marginal gain in utility from 
enjoying the child. In (2.17), the marginal loss in the parent’s utility from investing an 
additional unit of income in children’s education is equal to the marginal gain in 
children’s utility through increasing their wage income and earnings-dependent social 
security benefits and making them more effective in teaching their own children. A 
key difference between the individual choice of human capital investment and the 
social planner's is that individuals cannot choose average human capital, unlike the 
social planner.   
In these optimal conditions, it is also worth noting that none of social security, 
education subsidization and payroll taxation creates any wedge in the consumption-
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saving-bequest trade-off in (2.14) and (2.15). This is because private intergenerational 
transfers can counteract public intergenerational transfers in a Ricardian world 
inhabited by dynastic families as in the literature (e.g. Barro, 1974; Zhang, 1995). 
When social security transfers income from workers to retirees, ,y tC falls and ,o tC rises. 
In response to this change, an old parent can restore the balance between marginal 
utilities of consumption across generations by leaving more bequests to children tB in 
a dynastic model. When education subsidization financed by labor income taxation 
reduces the cost of education, there are conflicting impacts on ,y tC , the net impact can 
also motivate an old parent to change the amount of bequests tB to regain the balance 
between the marginal utilities of consumption across generations. 
However, all of education subsidization, social security and payroll taxation 
create wedges in the quantity-quality trade-off concerning children. Clearly, 
education subsidization reduces not only the cost of human capital investment relative 
to the benefit in (2.17) and but also the education cost of a child in (2.16). In addition, 
by increasing the earnings-dependent benefit, social security increases both the cost 
of a child in (2.16) and the benefit of human capital investment in (2.17). Moreover, 
social security also increases the bequest cost of a child in (2.16). Conversely, the 
payroll tax reduces both the cost of a child in (2.16) and the benefit of human capital 
investment in (2.17) by reducing the after-tax wage rate. 
We define the competitive equilibrium below: 
 
Definition 2.2. For 0t  and a given initial state ( 1N , 0K , 0H , 0L ), a competitive 
equilibrium with education subsidization and PAYG social security financed by a 
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labor income tax is a sequence of allocations  , , 1 1 0, , , , , , ,t y t o t t t t t t tB C C K H N S Y    , 
prices   0,t t tR W   and government policies   0, ,t t t t    such that: (i) taking the prices 
and the government policies as given, firms and households optimize and their 
solutions satisfy the budget constraints (2.2) and (2.3), the technologies (2.4) and 
(2.5), the optimal conditions (2.6), (2.7), and (2.14)-(2.17); (ii) the government 
budget is balanced, and (iii) all markets clear with 1t t tK L S   and per worker labor 
being equal to1 tvN ; (iv) X X for , , ,X H K N H by symmetry. 
 
 We now derive Pareto optima government policies to decentralize the socially 
optimal allocation into a competitive allocation. 
  
Proposition 2.1. For 0,t  Pareto optimal   0, ,t t t t     are characterized implicitly 
by the following equations: 
          1
1
,t tt t t t t t
t t




                            (2.18)  
          
2 11 2
1 1 1 1 1
1 1






t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t t
t t t
t tt t t
H HH HN R vN W
E E H E
H vN W H H HN




    
 
     
  
 
            
            
 (2.19) 
          1 1 1 1(1 ) [ (1 ) ]t t t t t t t t t t t tvN W H N vN W H E N         . (2.20) 
For 1 0t tH H   , no government intervention 1 0t t t       is Pareto optimal. 
For 1 0t tH H   , no government intervention 1 0t t t      leads to a situation 
whereby the net marginal benefit of human capital investment is lower in the 
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competitive equilibrium than in the socially optimal allocation, other things being 
equal. Neither social security nor education subsidization alone can be Pareto 
optimal. 
 
Proof. A sequence of government policy   0, ,t t t t     is Pareto optimal if and only if 
it transforms the system of equations characterizing the competitive equilibrium in 
Definition 2.2 to the same system of equations characterizing the socially optimal 
allocation in Definition 2.1. To begin with, note that the technologies in (2.4) and (2.5) 
are the same in both the competitive equilibrium and the socially optimal allocation. 
 The household budget constraints (2.2) and (2.3) and the market clearing 
condition 1 1t t tS N k  lead to  




o t t t t t t t t t t t t t t t y t t
t t t t t t t t t
C N k R N vN W H N N k N N E N C T
N vN W H N E N 
     
 
      
    
Substituting the government budget constraint and (1 )t t t t t ty k R vN W H   (due to 
the constant-return-to-scale technology), we get 
           , 1 1 , 1 1 1o t t t t y t t t t t t tC N y N C N N k N N E           
which is the feasibility condition in (2.9) for the economy.  
 The optimal conditions with respect to intergenerational transfers within a 
family in (2.10) and (2.14) are the same between the socially optimal allocation and 
the competitive equilibrium. Substituting (2.6) and (2.14) into the optimal condition 
(2.15) concerning lifecycle savings in the competitive equilibrium, we obtain the 
same optimal condition (2.11) in the socially optimal allocation.      
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 To compare optimal conditions (2.12) and (2.16) concerning fertility, we 
rewrite the latter in a few steps. From (2.3) we can express intergenerational transfers 
as 1 1 1 1 , 1 1/ / (1 ) /t t t t o t t t t t t tB k f k C N vN W H N           . Combining this and (2.7) 
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               
      
















   
 
where , 1 , 1 1( )t o t t o t tU C U C R        and 1 1 1t t tR f k     are also used. Thus, the 
net benefit of having an additional child in the competitive equilibrium (i.e. the left-
hand side less the right-hand side) minus the counterpart in the socially optimal 
allocation is: 
             1 1
, 1
t t t
t t t t t t t
o t t t
U W HN v W H E
C N R
   

      
 
which should equal zero so as to transform (2.16) to the same as (2.12). That is, the 
wedges created by 1, and t t t     should cancel out one another entirely in the optimal 
condition with respect to the number of children in order to obtain the socially 
optimal allocation. In particular, when 1 0t t t      , the optimal condition in 
(2.16) is indeed the same as that in (2.12). In general, when this overall wedge signed 
by the terms in the parentheses of the above expression is equal to zero without 
restricting ,  and  to zero, i.e.  1 1/ 0t t t t t t t t t tv W H E W H N R       , the optimal 
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condition (2.16) concerning fertility becomes the same as (2.12) in the socially 
optimal allocation. This justifies condition (2.18). However, when there is no social 
security with 1 0t   , the net marginal benefit of having an additional child with 
education subsidization financed by payroll taxation, 0t   and 0t  , is always 
greater in the competitive equilibrium than in the socially optimal allocation, as can 
be seen in the above expression. This fact calls for a negative net effect of social 
security, 1 0t   , on the net benefit of having a child for the full cancelation of 
wedges caused by education subsidization and payroll taxation. 
 To compare the optimal condition (2.17) with (2.13) concerning human 
capital investment, we rewrite (2.17) in the following steps. Using (2.14) and (2.15) 





1 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 1 1
1 12
(1 )
(1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) .
t t t
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o t t o t
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   
     
 
      
          
 
The net marginal benefit of human capital investment in the competitive equilibrium 
(i.e. the right-hand side less the left-hand side) minus the counterpart in the socially 
optimal allocation is equal to 
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Setting the terms in the brackets of the above expression at zero equalizes the net 
marginal benefits of human capital investment in the competitive equilibrium and in 
the socially optimal allocation and therefore justifies condition (2.19). When there is 
an externality in the form 2 1/ 0t tH H    , it is clear that in the above expression the 
overall wedge of 1, and t t t     should be non-zero to counteract the efficiency loss of 
the externality so as to make (2.17) be the same as (2.13). When there is no 
externality 2 1/ 0t tH H    , it is also clear that 1 0t t t      makes the above 
expression be equal to zero.  
 Also, when there is no education subsidization, condition (2.18) becomes 
2 1 1 2t t t tv N R     . Making use of this for substitution, the net benefit of human 
capital investment will be lower in the competitive equilibrium than in the socially 
optimal allocation if 0, 0, and 0     : 
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H EC E R vN
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because 1 1/ ( ) (1 ) / 0vN vN vN     for an interior solution for labor. 
 Condition (2.20) is merely the government budget constraint. Clearly, 
conditions (2.18)-(2.20) characterize Pareto optimal   0, ,t t t t     because it makes the 
system of equations characterizing the competitive equilibrium be the same as the 
system of equations characterizing the socially optimal allocation in all periods. □ 
 
 Proposition 2.1 states how social security and education subsidization 
financed by payroll taxation together can fully eliminate the efficiency losses of the 
human capital externality to achieve the socially optimal allocation. It also states that 
neither education subsidization nor social security alone financed by payroll taxation 
can achieve the socially optimal allocation. On the one hand, education subsidization 
financed by payroll taxation reduces the marginal cost of having an additional child, 
thereby making the use of social security necessary to drive up the marginal cost of 
having a child to the socially optimal level. On the other hand, social security cannot 
fully cancel out the negative effect of the accompanying payroll tax on the net 
marginal benefit of human capital investment when their effects on the net benefit of 
having a child are fully canceled out. 
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 It is important to observe that the Pareto optimal government policy rules in 
(2.18)-(2.20) are very general in nature and may include opposite policies from social 
security or education subsidization. For instance, Pareto optimal , ,  or  may be 
negative. The exact nature or interpretation of the Pareto optimal government policy 
hinges on how social security affects fertility. Given that the human capital 
externality reduces the private return on education spending relative to the return on 
having an additional child, we expect fertility to be too high and education spending 
to be too low in the competitive equilibrium without government intervention. This 
situation is indeed similar to what we observe in countries in the early development 
stage. Starting from this situation, if social security financed by payroll taxation 
reduces fertility then it can be helpful to change fertility toward its first-best level 
along with education subsidization.  
 However, there is no guarantee that social security financed by payroll 
taxation can reduce fertility because social security and payroll taxation have 
opposing effects on the cost of having an additional child in (2.16): a positive one via 
the replacement rate and bequests and a negative one via the payroll tax rate. The 
former effect is stronger if the discounting factor  is larger. Thus, other things being 
equal, it is more likely for social security to raise the cost of a child and hence to 
reduce fertility if the discounting factor is greater. Intuitively, a greater discounting 
factor in the preference means a stronger motive for investing in human capital and 
for leaving bequests relative to the motive for having more children. In this regard, 
Cigno and Rosati (1992) and Zhang and Zhang (2004) find empirical evidence that 
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social security reduces fertility, supporting our focusing on social security as part of 
the Pareto optimal government policy rather than on an opposite policy.     
 In the next section, we consider an example with log utility and Cobb-Douglas 
technologies in order to derive the reduced form of the Pareto optimal government 
policy. The example will help convince that the Pareto optimal combination of social 
security and education subsidization financed by labor income taxation is non-empty 
for plausible parameterizations. 
  
2.5. Example: logarithmic utility and Cobb-Douglas technologies 
Let the utility function be , , , ,( , , ) ln (ln ln )o t y t t o t y t tU C C N C C N     , where 
(0,1)  is the taste for utility derived from the consumption of the old parent, 
(0,1)  is the taste for utility from the young-age consumption and the number of 
children of each working member, and 0  is the taste for utility from the number 
of children relative to that from young-age consumption. If we equally value 
consumption undertaken by each of coexisting old and working members in a family 
in their identical utility function, then the values of  and  may depend on the 
relative length of lifetime in working age to old age. Since in reality the working 
period is longer than the retirement period,  may be greater than . We rewrite the 
utility function as           
, ,
0
[ ln (ln ln )], 0 , 1, 0.t o t y t t
t
C C N      

                                 (2.21) 
The production and education functions now take the following respective 
forms: 
   71
      1[ (1 ) ] , 0, 0 1,t t t t tY DK L vN H D
                                                     (2.22) 
      1 11 ( ) , 0, 0 1, 0 1.t t t tH AE H H A
                                                (2.23) 
When 1  , there is no externality from average human capital in this model. 
However, when 1  , the externality takes the form of positive spillovers from 
average human capital to the formation of human capital of every child. The wage 
rate per unit of effective labor and the real interest factor are then given by  
        (1 ) ,t tW D
                                                                                              (2.24) 
       1t tR D
   ,                                                                                                 (2.25) 
where /[ (1 ) ]t t t t tK L vN H   is the physical capital-effective labor ratio. 
The first-order conditions of the social planner problem in (2.10)-(2.13) 
become the following: 
, , 1
1
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       .                                               (2.29) 
 The first-order conditions in the individual utility maximization in (2.14)-
(2.17) become the following: 
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    
   
    (2.33) 
With the log utility and Cobb-Douglas technologies and with the full 
depreciation of capital within one period, we expect the proportional allocations of 
time and output and the rates of the tax, the subsidy and the replacement to be 
constant over time, given any initial state. Thus, we can transform the variables in the 
overall feasibility, the budget constraints and the first-order conditions into their 
relative ratios to output per worker. For notational ease, we denote the fraction of 
output per worker spent on item tX by a lower-case variable /t t tx X y . 
In the social planner problem, the transformed feasibility in the economy and 
the transformed first-order conditions are gives as follows:  









     (for 0t  ),                                                                (2.36) 
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 1 (1 )(1 ) (1 )
(1 )y y y
v e
c vN c N c N N
           ,            (2.37) 
s  ,                                                    (2.38) 
(1 )
1 (1 )
eN    
   .                                                              (2.39) 
From these conditions, we obtain the following constant allocation rules in the social 
planner allocation, denoted by a superscript SP : 
(1 )[1 (1 )]
( )[1 (1 )]
SP
yc
   
   
      ,                                                                         (2.40) 
SPs  ,                                                                                                        (2.41) 






v N           ,                                                 (2.42) 
where 







   .                                                                                  (2.43) 
The transformed budget constraints and first-order conditions in the competitive 
economy are:  
 , (1 )(1 ) (1 )y t t t t t t tc b s e N         ,                                                     (2.44) 
 , 1( (1 ) )o t t t t t t tc N b e N        ,                                                            (2.45)  









     (for 0t  ),                                                                (2.47) 





  ,                                                                                                 (2.48)                               
 (1 )(1 )(1 ) (1 )
(1 ) (1 )y y y y
v eNv e b
vN c c vN c Nc N
               ,                          (2.49) 
     (1 )(1 ) (1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 ) .eN Ne                                  (2.50) 
From these equilibrium conditions, we obtain the following constant allocation rules 
in the competitive equilibrium, denoted by a superscript CE : 
(1 )[1 (1 )](1 )
(1 ) (1 )[1 (1 )]
( )
CEb        
       
         
         
,                                        (2.51) 
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CEs  ,                                                                                                     (2.53) 
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(1 ) (1 ) 1 (1 )
(1 ) ( ) (1 )
        (1 ) 1 (1 ) ( )(1 ) ,
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nN        
      
        
          
        
      
 
(1 ) [1 (1 )]CE
CEe N
        ,                                                                      (2.55) 
where  2(1 )[1 (1 )]          . We summarize the competitive solution and 
the socially optimal solution in Table 2.1.  
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Table 2.1 Comparison between the competitive solution and the socially optimal 
solution  
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    
Note: the superscripts ‘CE’ and ‘SP’ refer to the competitive solution and the socially 
optimal solution, respectively.  
  
 Because log utility excludes corner solutions for fertility, the presence of non-
convexity in the form of 1t tN k   or t tE N in the feasibility in the economy (2.9) or in 
the form of 1t tN B   or t tE N  in the budget constraints (2.2) or (2.3) may lead to a 
situation in which there is no solution for fertility for some parameter values. This 
situation is ruled out by Assumption 2.1 with general functional forms. In our 
example with the specific functional forms, the restriction for a unique optimal 
interior solution is explicitly given below: 
 
Lemma 2.1. There exists a unique interior solution ,0( , , , , , )y o oc c c e N s  in the social 
planner problem if the taste for the number of children is strong enough such that 
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  (1 )[1 (1 )] (1 )(1 )( )
[1 (1 )](1 )
SP            
           .  
 
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix B. 
 The remaining task is to find out the Pareto optimal rates of the income tax 
and the education subsidy, and the Pareto optimal ratio of social security benefits to 
wage income 1[ (1 ) ]t t t t tT N vN W H  . 
 
2.5.1. Pareto optimal social security and education subsidization 
For notational ease, let us define an upper bound on the taste parameter: 
2
(1 )( ) (1 )[1 (1 )](1 )
[1 (1 )](1 )
           
          . 
It is easy to verify that under   , social security financed by payroll taxation 
reduces fertility as in Yew and Zhang (2009). The optimal government policy in our 
example is given below. 
 
Proposition 2.2. For 0t  and 0 1  , if   , then the Pareto optimal social 
security and education subsidization financed by payroll taxation are characterized 
by the following equations:  
  **
2
(1 )(1 ) 1 (1 ) (1 )
0
1 (1 )
          
         , 
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          
     
         

                
           
   
        
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t t t t
T e N
N vN W H
  

    . 
 
When 1  , * * 0tT    . 
 
Proof. We obtain the optimal tax rate and the subsidy rate by equalizing the 
competitive solution with the social planner’s given in Table 2.1. It is easy to verify 
that under 0 1   and   , * 0  and * 0  . Obviously, CEs = SPs . Substituting 
( * , * ) into the competitive solution leads to CE SPy yc c , CEN = SPN , and CEe = SPe . 
Thus, the competitive equilibrium under ( * , * ) is first-best. The social security 
benefit relative to the payroll tax revenue is obtained by using the government budget 
constraint, which is positive because 
   
*
*
(1 )(1 ) 1 (1 ) ( )(1 ) 1







       
       
             . 
 It follows that * *(1 ) ( ) 0SP SPe N     . It is also obvious that, when 1  , 
* * 0tT    .  
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 An alternative proof of Proposition 2.2 can also be made by applying the 
specific functional forms to the general rules in (2.18)-(2.20) of Proposition 2.1.  
 
 Proposition 2.2 illustrates that neither education subsidization nor social 
security can achieve the first-best alone, albeit each of them tips children’s quantity-
quality trade-off in the right direction when the taste for the number of children is not 
too strong. When education subsidization and social security are implemented 
together, they can reinforce each other to fully eliminate the efficiency loss of human 
capital externalities under the same condition under which social security reduces 
fertility.  
   
2.5.2. Numerical examples 
Now, we perform a quantitative assessment of the optimal tax and subsidy rates and 
the optimal ratio of social security benefits to wage income for plausible 
parameterizations. The purpose is to find out whether the simulated optimal values 
can approximate the observed counterpart in the real world. For a better comparison, 
we begin with a case without externality ( 1  ) and then look at cases with the 
externality ( 0 1  ). 
 The values of parameters are either chosen in line with those in the literature if 
available (e.g., 0.6  , 0.33  ), or chosen to yield plausible values for fertility and 
for the fractions of income invested in both types of capital (e.g. 0.1v  , 0.3  , 
0.27  and 0.93  ). Taking one period as 30 years, the value of the discounting 
factor at 0.6   corresponds to an annual discounting factor of 0.9855 as in Gomme, 
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Kydland and Rupert (2001). Here, a smaller share parameter associated with physical 
inputs in education ( 0.27  ) than in production reflects the fact that education is 
less physical (more human) capital intensive than production.  
 A key parameter for the human capital externality is  . In a log linear version 
of the determination of children’s human capital or skills in equation (2.23), the 
coefficient on log average human capital in the parental generation is equal to 
(1 )(1 )   . In a similar equation, Borjas (1995) runs regressions of children’s 
skills on two variables: parental skills and the mean skills of the ethnic group of the 
parents’ generation. In doing so, he uses data sets in the United States and uses either 
education attainment or the log real wage as the proxy for skills. The estimated 
coefficient on the mean human capital or mean skills of the ethnic group in the 
parents’ generation (defined as ethnic capital therein) is 0.18 when education 
attainment is used as the proxy, and is 0.30 when the log wage is used. Applying his 
estimates to the coefficient (1 )(1 )    in our model, we have either 0.75  or 
0.6  . Note that both education attainment and real wage are only approximate 
indicators of human capital or skills. The former does not capture the quality of 
education, whereas the latter may include possible factors that are not determined in 
the production of human capital in the real world such as human capital externalities 
in the production of goods. To be more conservative on the strength of the human 
capital externality in the production of human capital, we thus regard 0.7 as the lower 
bound for  (or 0.3 as the upper bound on 1  ) and 0.7 0.85  as a plausible 
range. We will vary it gradually toward the case without any externality ( 1  ) for 
better comparisons.  
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In Table 2.2, we report the numerical results of the optimal rates of the income 
tax and the education subsidy and the optimal ratio of social security benefits to wage 
income, corresponding to the values of   from 1 to 0.7 in six cases. Case 1 has no 
externality ( 1  ) and gives the Pareto optimal solution without any government 
intervention ( 0   ). In Case 2 through to 6, the externality is present 
( 0.7 1  ). When the externality becomes stronger (smaller  ), the optimal income 
tax rate becomes higher accordingly and hence leads to a higher optimal rate of 
education subsidies and a higher optimal ratio of social security benefits to wage 
income. In particular, for an externality at 0.95  , the corresponding optimal rates 
for the income tax, the education subsidy, and social security benefits are about 7%, 
8%, and 5%, respectively. For the value of  in the plausible range from 0.85   to 
0.7   the corresponding optimal rates for the income tax, the education subsidy, 
and social security benefits are in the range from 18% to 31%, 20% to 34%, and 13% 
to 21%, respectively. These high contribution rates are in line with the observed 
counterparts in many industrial nations. Note that the optimal rates for the social 
security benefits at any given level of externalities are close to those obtained in 
Chapter 1. These simulation results therefore imply that social security alone cannot 
fully eliminate the efficiency loss of human capital externalities under the same 
condition that human capital investment is still below the socially optimal level 
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Table 2.2 Simulations with first-best tax rates and the share of social security 
benefits 
 
Parameters: 0.6, 0.3, 0.27, 0.93, 0.33, 0.1v           
Variables  =1  =0.95  =0.9  =0.85  =0.8  =0.7 
*  0 0.0711 0.1319 0.1846 0.2306 0.3071 
*  0 0.0778 0.1444 0.2021 0.2524 0.3362 
* *(1 ) ( )
1








In this paper we have derived Pareto social security and education subsidization 
financed by payroll taxation that can fully eliminate the efficiency losses of human 
capital externalities in a dynastic family model with two types of capital and 
endogenous fertility. We have also shown that neither conventional education 
subsidization nor social security financed by payroll taxation alone can bring fertility 
and education spending to their first-best levels at the same time. When social 
security reduces fertility, it reinforces education subsidization to tip children’s 
quality-quantity trade-off in the right direction until education spending and fertility 
reach their first-best levels. The results differ from those in existing studies that 
typically obtain second best allocations when fertility is endogenous.  
 Our result may be useful contributions with model assumptions based on 
existing empirical evidence of the prevalence of human capital externalities, the 
insignificant effect of social security on savings, and the negative effect of social 
security on fertility. The policy implication of our analysis in this paper is a warning 
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against reform plans calling for transforming PAYG social security to compulsory 
individual saving schemes. According to Zhang (1995), an inframarginal funded 
component is neutral if the benefit is linked to one’s own contribution and hence, 
compulsory individual saving schemes are not useful to mitigate the efficiency loss of 
human capital externalities in this model. Since education subsidization and PAYG 
social security can reinforce each other to fully eliminate the efficiency loss caused 
by human capital externalities in this model, our analysis also calls for a caution 
against reform plans that cut public funding for education in the last two decades in 
some industrial nations.  
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Appendix B 
Proof of Lemma 2.1. First, it is easy to verify that for the social planner’s solution, if 
SP   (as defined in the lemma) then 0SPnN  according to the solution for fertility 
in (2.42). Consequently, with 0SPnN  , we must have 0 1/SPN v  . Here, it is 
obvious that 0SPN   under SP   because then the numerator of SPN , i.e. SPnN , is 
positive and the denominator, (1 )( )[1 (1 )]SPnN          , is also positive. 
These facts under SP   also imply 






N           ,  
leading to 1/SPN v . Note that SPe  >0 in (2.43) and 0SPyc  in (2.40). Then, 0SPoc   
in (2.35), and ,0 0
SP
oc   in (2.36). Clearly, 0SPs   in (2.38). Note also that the solution 
for each of these variables is unique under the stated conditions. 
  The remaining task is to argue for the optimality. The optimality builds on the 
following facts. (i) Since the log utility excludes corner solutions, any solution for 
fertility or for consumption must be strictly positive. (ii) All choice variables lie in 
closed and bounded sets: ,0, , ,y o oc c c e  and s  are in 0,1 , and N  in 0,1/ v . (iii) The 
utility function tU is continuous in the interior values of the choice variables 
( , , )y oc c N . (iv) The utility level tU is bounded above under 1  . By (i)-(iv), there is 
at least one optimum. From both (i) and the uniqueness of the interior solution, the 
optimum must correspond to this unique solution.     
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CHAPTER 3 
Golden-rule social security and public health in a dynastic model with 
endogenous life expectancy and fertility 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Most of the developed nations have instituted pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security 
programs and public health programs (see, e.g., Aaron, 1985; Lee and Tuljapurkar 
1997) for several decades.  At the same time, they have observed dramatic increases 
in life expectancy and declines in fertility, decelerating population growth and leading 
to population aging. According to OECD (2007), population growth rates for all 
OECD countries between 1990 and 2005 averaged a little over 0.6% per year, half the 
rate observed in the 1960s and 1970s. During the same period, the percentage of the 
population aged 65 or older has risen in all these countries and is expected to rise 
further in the coming decades. As pointed out by Tang and Zhang (2007), there were 
upward trends in the ratio of public to private health expenditure and in life 
expectancy in the time series data of the United States for the period 1870-2000.  The 
steady population aging has caused serious concerns about future economic growth, 
the pressure on funding social security and public health care, and the wellbeing of a 
greyer population. 
Therefore, it is interesting to explore the implications of PAYG social security 
and public health for fertility, life expectancy, capital accumulation, economic growth 
and welfare. We will carry out this task in a dynastic model of neoclassical growth 
with altruistic bequests, endogenous fertility and actuarially fair annuity markets.  
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In our model, a rise in the tax rate for social security has opposing effects on 
fertility and capital accumulation. On the one hand, by increasing the bequest cost of 
having a child, the tax rise tends to reduce fertility and raise capital intensity. On the 
other hand, by reducing the after tax wage rate, the opportunity cost of spending time 
rearing a child falls and hence, the tax rise tends to increase fertility and reduce 
capital intensity. Moreover, the forgone social security benefits of spending time 
rearing a child rises with the tax rate under a PAYG system, thereby adding to the 
cost of a child to channel a negative effect of PAYG social security on fertility and a 
positive effect on capital intensity. A rise in the tax rate for public health care also 
exerts conflicting effects on fertility and capital accumulation. On the one hand, when 
the tax rate for public health increases, the time cost of spending time rearing a child 
falls and thus fertility may rise and capital intensity may fall. When higher public 
health spending drives up life expectancy, agents may shift focus from the number of 
children toward old-age consumption, thereby tending to reduce fertility and raise 
saving and capital intensity. Our main finding is that the net effect of a tax rise in 
social security or public health on fertility will depend on the taste for the number, 
relative to the welfare, of children. When the taste for the number of children is 
weaker but sufficiently close or equal to that for the welfare of children, social 
security and public health can reduce fertility and thus can raise both capital and 
output per worker.  
 The opposite movement of fertility and capital intensity affects welfare. On 
the one hand, a reduction in fertility reduces welfare as households obtain utility from 
the number of children. On the other hand, however, an increase in capital intensity 
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increases labor productivity and increases welfare. The net welfare effect will depend 
on the relative strength of the tastes for the welfare and number of children. We 
illustrate numerically that when the taste for the number of children is weaker but 
sufficiently close or equal to that for the welfare of children, social security and 
public health can be welfare enhancing by reducing fertility and raising capital 
intensity. Due to the complexity of the model, our analysis and results are limited to 
the steady state. Therefore, our optimal social security and public health should be 
associated with the notion of the "golden rule" in the literature on neoclassical growth. 
Our analysis differs from the large body of related literature. Samuelson 
(1958), Diamond (1965), Barro (1974), Feldstein (1974), Hubbard and Judd (1987), 
Zhang (1995), Rosati (1996), and Corneo and Marquardt (2000) investigate the 
impact of social security on savings; Kaganovich and Zilcha (1999), Cooley and 
Soares (1999), Zhang and Zhang (2007), and Yew and Zhang (2009), among others, 
study the welfare implications of social security; Zhang (1995), Sanchez-Losada 
(2000), and Kemnitz and Wigger (2000) show that with human capital, social security 
can promote growth, which is consistent with the empirical evidence in Zhang and 
Zhang (2004) that social security has positive effects on human capital investment 
and on the growth rate of per capita income.  
However, most of these studies dealing with social security usually do not 
consider public health and life expectancy at the same time, as they usually treat life 
expectancy as an exogenous parameter. For instance, Ehrlich and Lui (1991), Hu 
(1999), de la Croix and Licandro (1999), and Zhang and Zhang (2001), conclude that 
higher life expectancy increases the rate of return to human capital investment and 
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leads to higher human capital investment and faster per capita growth;  Barro (1997) 
and Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) find empirical evidence that life expectancy has a 
positive effect on economic growth when income is low, and that the growth effect 
fades away when income is high; and Zhang et al. (2001) show that a rise in longevity 
has direct as well as indirect effects on fertility, human capital investment, and 
growth in a dynastic family model with social security. However, there are some 
empirical studies that provide evidence that life expectancy can be affected by factors 
such as average income. For instance, Preston (1975) empirically shows that in 
aggregate data, income contributes positively to life expectancy. Hence, the inclusion 
of life expectancy as an endogenous variable in the analysis of social security is 
highly relevant. 
Though there are studies that consider endogenous life expectancy, these 
studies usually do not consider social security at the same time.  For instance, Ehrlich 
and Chuma (1990) concern the role of endowed wealth, health, and other initial 
conditions in determining the demand for health and longevity, among others; Leung 
et al. (2004) consider gender-specific factors in the determination of life expectancy; 
Chakraborty and Das (2005) show that in the absence of perfect annuities markets, 
the interplay between income and mortality can generate poverty traps by assuming a 
positive relationship between probability of survival and private health investment; 
and Tang and Zhang (2007) investigate health investment, human capital investment, 
and life cycle savings and show that subsidies on health and human capital 
investment can improve welfare. 
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There are a few exceptions that model endogenous life expectancy in the 
studies on social security and health. Davies and Kuhn (1992) consider the intake of 
health related goods that endogenously affect life expectancy and show that a social 
security system would encourage suboptimal health investment, leading to excessive 
longevity, in the presence of a moral hazard problem. Philipson and Becker (1998) 
consider life expectancy under the influence of public programs, such as health care 
and social insurance and pointed out that all forms of old-age income annuity, such as 
private life insurance or social security programs, would have a similar effect on life 
prolongation. Zhang et al. (2006) analyze the relationships between life-cycle saving 
and health investments in different stages of life, and examine the effects of public 
pensions and health subsidies on health investments, longevity, capital accumulation, 
and welfare. However, these studies have ignored the combination of such important 
factors as altruistic intergenerational transfers and endogenous fertility that may lead 
to very different results.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the 
model. Section 3.3 characterizes the equilibrium and examines the long-run effects of 
social security and public health on fertility, life expectancy, capital intensity, and 
output per worker. Section 3.4 discusses the welfare implication of social security and 
public health and optimal rates in the long run numerically. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2. The model 
The model economy is inhabited by overlapping generations of a large number of 
identical agents who live for three periods. In the first period of life, agents do not 
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make any decision. In their second period of life, they work and make decisions on 
life-cycle savings, the number of children, the amount of bequests to children and 
their own consumption; they retire when old.15 Survival is certain from childhood 
through middle-age, but each middle-aged agent faces a probability (0,1)p  to 
survive to old age. We assume that children and middle-aged agents (hence old-age 
survivors) in the same generation are identical.  
  The utility function of a middle-aged agent, tV , is defined over own middle-
age consumption, tc , own old-age consumption, 1td  , the number of children, tn , and 
the utility of each identical child, 1tV  :
16 
  1 1ln ln ln , , , (0,1); 0t t t t t tV c p d n V                         (3.1) 
where  is the discounting factor.17 The assumption of a logarithmic utility function 
helps to ensure tractability.  Here,   is the taste for utility derived from own old-age 
consumption,  is the taste for utility derived from the number of children. We 
                                                 
15 Intentional bequests made by parents can be in the forms of inter vivos gifts and post-mortem 
bequests. Bequests in this model are of the inter vivos form which is consistent with the empirical 
evidence (i.e., Gale and Scholz, 1994) that suggests inter vivos are substantial. However, we expect 
both forms of inter vivos and post-mortem bequests to yield similar qualitative result concerning the 
effect of social security on the bequests cost of a child. This is because when parents value their 
children’s welfare, a rise in the social security tax rate would increase the amount of intentional 
bequests to offset the increased tax burden on their children, regardless of whether the bequests are 
made in the form of inter vivos or post-mortem bequests.  
16 Our use of an altruistic model is consistent with some of the existing empirical evidence. See Tomes 
(1981), Laitner and Juster (1996), and Laitner and Ohlsson (2001), for instance. In particular, the 
empirical studies of Laitner and Ohlsson (2001) show that the bequest behavior in Sweden and the U.S. 
offers support for the altruistic model. 
17 There are various assumptions on preferences in the overlapping-generations models dealing with 
the demographic changes in the economy. Becker and Barro (1988) assume dynastic preferences where 
the discount factor is a function of the number of children. However, that assumption may not lead to 
analytical solutions with endogenous life expectancy. To obtain analytical solutions, we assume that 
 is independent of the number of children as in Lapan and Enders (1990) and Zhang (1995).  
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assume that the survival rate is increasing in public health, tM , at a decreasing rate: 
2
0 1 / t
a M
tp a a e  , where 0, 1, 2 0 10;a a a a a  .  
 In period t , a middle-aged agent devotes tvn  units of time endowment to 
rearing children where 0 1v  is fixed. The remaining (1 )tvn  units of time is 
devoted to working that earns (1 )(1 )T Mt t t tvn w     where w is the wage rate per 
unit of labor, T  is the contribution rate for social security, and M  is the tax rate for 
public health. This agent receives a bequest with earned interest, (1 )t tb r , from his or 
her old parent at the beginning of  period t, and leaves a bequest, 1tb  , to each child at 
the end of period t so that children receive bequests regardless of their parents’ 
survival status at old age. He or she spends the earnings and the received bequest with 
earned interest on own middle-age consumption, tc , retirement savings via actuarially 
fair annuity markets (1 )t t ts vn w , and bequests to children 1t tb n where ts is the saving 
rate. An old agent spends his or her savings plus interest income and social security 
benefits on own consumption, 1td  . The budget constraints can be written as: 
    1(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ,
T M
t t t t t t t t t tc b r s vn w b n                                                 (3.2)            
      1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) /t t t t t t td r s vn w p T      ,                                                            (3.3)            
where T is the amount of social security benefits per retiree.   
  As practiced in many countries such as the U.S., France and Germany, the 
amount of social security benefits received by a retiree depends on his or her own 
earnings in working age according to a replacement rate .  
 The government budget constraints are given by  
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 1 1 1 1(1 ) (1 ) /
T
t t t t t t t t t tT vn w n vn w p        , 
 (1 )Mt t t tM vn w   
where the bar above a variable indicates its average level in the economy. 18 With 
identical agents in the same generation, in equilibrium we have ; ;n n p p M M    
by symmetry. In this model, we focus on public healthcare systems that are available 
in many industrial nations. 
  The production of the single final good is 
  1(1 ) , 0, (0,1), 0,1t t t tY AK vn K A                       (3.4) 
where tY  and tK are output per worker and physical capital per worker, respectively; A 
is the total factor productivity parameter,   is the share parameter of capital, and   
measures the strength of spillovers from average capital per worker tK . Since one 
period in this model corresponds to about 30 years, it is reasonable to assume that 
physical capital depreciates fully within one period. When 0  , there is no 
externality from average physical capital in this model. However, when 0  , the 
externality takes the form of positive spillovers from average physical capital to the 
production of the final good. 19  However, the exact degree of this externality is 
unclear. When 1   , the externality is strong enough to generate endogenous 
growth in an AK-style model. However, Jones (1995), using time series data in 
                                                 
18 With this formula linking the amount of one’s social security benefits to his or her own past 
earnings, a worker who has more children (hence more time to rearing children and less time to 
working) will not only earn less wage income today but also receive less social security benefits in old 
age.   
19 The investment externality has been emphasized in the literature on economic growth (e.g. Arrow, 
1962; Romer, 1986; Lucas, 1993). Based on an international cross-section of country data, DeLong 
and Summers (1991) argued that the spillovers from equipment investment are very substantial. See 
also Bernstein and Nadiri (1988, 1989), and Nakanishi (2002)) for examples of externalities found in 
studies of research and development (R&D) stock.  
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OECD countries, finds empirical evidence against this type of model. We therefore 
limit our attention to 1 0    . 
  Factors are paid by their marginal products; and the price of the sole final 
good is normalized to unity. The wage rate per unit of labor and the real interest 
factor are then given by  
        (1 ) /(1 ),t t tw Y vn                                                                                       (3.5)          
       1 /t t tr Y K  ,                                                                                                (3.6) 
The physical capital market clears when  
        1 1(1 ) / .t t t t t t tK s vn w b n n                                                                        (3.7)           
 
3.3. The equilibrium and results 
We now solve the dynastic family’s problem and track down the equilibrium 
allocation. 
 
3.3.1. Equilibrium solution for the dynastic family problem 
The problem of a dynastic family is to maximize utility in (3.1) subject to budget 
constraints (3.2) and (3.3), the earnings dependent benefit formula, taking the 
probability to survive to old age, taxes and replacement rates as given. This problem 





{ln[ (1 ) (1 )(1 ) ]max
ln[(1 ) (1 ) / (1 ) ] ln }
t t t
t T M
t t t t t t t t t
b n s t
t t t t t t t t t
b r s vn w b n








       
    
  
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where we have used the budget constraints and the earnings dependent benefit 
formula for substitution. For t ≥ 0, the first-order conditions are given as follows:20 
 11
1
















 ,                                                                                       (3.9) 
           1 1
1
(1 ) (1 ):
T M
t t t t t t t t t
t t
t t t t
vw s b p r vw sn vw
c d p n
    

         
             (3.10) 
  
In (3.8), the marginal loss in utility from giving a bequest to each child is 
equal to the marginal gain in children’s utility. In (3.9), the marginal loss in utility 
from saving is equal to the marginal gain in utility in old age through receiving the 
return to saving. In (3.10), the marginal loss in utility from having an additional child, 
through giving up a fraction of wage income, saving plus interest income and 
earnings-dependent social security benefits, and leaving a bequest to this child, is 
equal to the marginal gain in utility from enjoying the child. These first-order 
conditions hold for all t ≥ 0. 
 The equilibrium of the economy is described below. 
 
Definition. Given an initial state ( 0b , 0K ), a competitive equilibrium in the economy 
with PAYG social security and public health is a sequence of allocations 
 1 1 1 1 0, , , , , , , , , , , ,T Mt t t t t t t t t t t t t tb c d K n s T M p Y        and prices  01 ,t t tr w  such that (i) 
                                                 
20 Note that the transversality conditions are satisfied in this model because the Bellman equation of 
this maximization problem meets Blackwell’s sufficient conditions to be a contraction with 1  . 
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taking prices and government policies  1 0, , , ,T Mt t t t t tM T     as given, firms and 
households optimize and their solutions are feasible, (ii) the government budgets are 
balanced, (iii) all markets clear with  1 1(1 ) /t t t t t t tK s vn w b n n     and per worker 
labor being equal to (1 )tvn , and (iv) ; ;n n p p M M    by symmetry.  
 
Specifically, these equilibrium conditions correspond to the first-order 
conditions of firms and households, the budget constraints of households and the 
government, the production technology, the capital market clearing condition, and the 
amount of labor supply per worker equal to (1 )tvn , for t ≥ 0. In addition, as 
mentioned earlier, we have ; ;n n p p M M    in equilibrium by symmetry. 
Because the model is too complex to be tractable for its full dynamic path, we will 
only focus on the analysis of the steady state equilibrium.  
Since labor income is a constant fraction, (1 ) , of output per worker in this 
model, letting /(1 )c t t tc vn w   , 1 1/(1 )(1 )d t t t td r vn w     , 1 /(1 )b t t t tb n vn w   , 
we transform variables in the budget constraints and first-order conditions into their 
relative ratios to labor income in order to achieve the steady state solution. The 








            ,                                                  (3.11) 




    
   .                                                                          (3.12) 
Similarly, the transformed first-order conditions are:  
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1b
s     ,                                                                                               (3.13) 
 c d  ,                                                                                                      (3.14) 
 (1 )





vn n vn n
    
  
      ,                                                           (3.15) 
The expression (3.15) can be derived by using 1 1 11 /t t tr Y K    , 
where 1 1 1 1 1(1 ) / (1 ),  and (1 ) /t t t t t t t t t tY vn w K s vn w b n n          . The left-hand 
side of (3.15) contains three cost components of a child. The first cost component is 
the forgone wage income of spending time rearing a child, which falls with the tax 
rates for social security or public health, other things being equal. The second cost 
component is the bequest cost of a child, which should rise with the tax rates for 
social security but may rise or fall with the tax rates for public health. On the one 
hand, altruistic parents are tempted to reduce the tax burdens of social security on 
their children and thus higher tax rates for social security increase the bequest cost of 
a child and tend to reduce fertility. On the other hand, with higher tax rates for public 
health, life expectancy rises and thus agents increase their life-cycle savings and may 
reduce the amount of bequests. The third cost component is the forgone social 
security benefit of spending time rearing a child, which rises with the tax rate for 
social security through the linkage between the replacement rate and the tax rate for 
social security under a balanced social security budget.  
On the one hand, when the tax rate for social security rises, the subsequent 
rise in the third cost component partially offsets the fall in the first cost component, 
and the overall time cost of having a child is likely to fall. However, the possible rise 
in the bequest cost of a child due to higher tax rates for social security may reduce 
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fertility. On the other hand, when the tax rate for public health rises, a fall in the time 
cost of having a child tends to increase fertility but the possible rise in the bequest 
cost of a child tends to reduce fertility. The net effect of social security or public 
health on fertility will depend on the taste for the number, relative to the welfare, of 
children. When the taste for the welfare of every child, , becomes stronger, the third 
cost components of a child in (3.15) become larger and hence it is more likely that 
social security or public health reduces fertility. By contrast, when the taste for the 
number of children, , becomes stronger, the marginal benefit of a child becomes 
larger and hence it is more likely for a rise in the tax rate for social security or for 
public health to raise fertility.  
From these equilibrium conditions, we obtain the following steady-state 
allocation rules:  
 
 ( ( , )) ( , ) 1 (1 )( ) (1 )
(1 )( ( , ))




                  
             
                                                                                                                                 (3.16) 
 [ (1 ) (1 )(1 )]
(1 )( ( , ))
M
c T Mp
         
      ,                                                                (3.17) 
 
 ( , ) 1 (1 )( ) (1 )
(1 )( ( , ))





         
    
          ,                      (3.18)                             
  (1 )( ( , ))[1 (1 ) ]nT M T Mn
nn
v n p              ,                             (3.19) 
where the numerator of n is  
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

(1 ) (1 )(1 ) ( ( , ))
( , ) 1 (1 )( ) (1 ) ,
M T M
n
T M T M T
n p
p
          
        
         
       
 
 [ (1 ) (1 )(1 )]
(1 )( ( , ))
M
d T Mp
          
      ,                                                            (3.20)                               
Note that life expectancy ( , )T Mp    is a constant function in equilibrium: 
2 ( , )
0 1( , ) /
T Ma MT Mp a a e       where M is a function of and T M  via n in (3.19): 
11 ( ) 1 1 ( )( , ) (1 ) (1 )T M MM A vn
n
 
       

              .  
We can easily observe that if nn >0 then fertility n is positive in (3.19). 
However, since the log utility function excludes corner solutions for fertility, the 
presence of non-convexity in the form of 1t tb n  in the budget constraint (3.2) may 
lead to a situation in which there is no solution for fertility for some parameter values. 
As shown in Zhang et al. (2001) and Zhang (1995), the sufficient condition for the 
solution to be optimal is a sufficiently large taste parameter for the number of 
children ( ) such that an interior solution for fertility exists. In order to obtain 
positive fertility in (3.19), we assume 0 1[ ( )(1 )] / (1 )a a             . 
Further, we assume a strong enough taste for the welfare of children ( ) such that 
bequests are positive:   0 1 0 1[ ( )(1 )] / 1 ( )a a a a          . 21  We now 
investigate how fertility, capital per worker and output per worker respond to rises in 
tax rates for unfunded social security and public health:22  
                                                 
21 Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) indicate that bequests are important elements in accounting for 
capital accumulation. 
22    denotes  approaches  from below. 
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Proposition 3.1. If   , then a rise in the tax rate for unfunded social security, T , 
reduces fertility, raises capital per worker, and raises output per worker. As    , 
then a rise in the tax rate for public health, M , reduces fertility, raises capital per 
worker, and raises output per worker. All those effects of a rise in M are also true 
when  . 
 
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix C.  
A rise in the tax rate for social security has opposing effects on fertility. On 
the one hand, by increasing the bequest cost of having a child, the tax rise tends to 
reduce fertility. On the other hand, by reducing the after tax wage rate, the 
opportunity cost of spending time rearing a child falls and therefore the tax rise tends 
to increase fertility. Moreover, the forgone social security benefit of spending time 
rearing a child rises with the tax rate for social security via the linkage between the 
replacement rate and the tax rate for social security under a balanced social security 
budget. In this way, it channels a negative effect of a rise in the tax rate on fertility. 
Thus, there are opposing effects of a rise in the tax rate for social security on fertility. 
The net effect of social security on fertility will depend on the taste for the number, 
relative to the welfare, of children. When the taste for the welfare of children,  , is 
not weaker than the taste for the number of children,  , i.e., when   , the cost 
component of a child in terms of forgone social security benefits in equation (3.15) 
become larger and hence it is more likely that a rise in the tax rate for social security 
reduces fertility and leads to a rise in both capital and output per worker.  
   103
 When the tax rate for public health increases, the time cost of spending time 
rearing a child falls and leads to higher fertility. However, when the tax rate for 
public health increases, the provision of public health per worker increases and hence 
life expectancy increases, given the fertility level. With higher life expectancy, agents 
receive lower returns on retirement savings and social security benefits and as a 
consequence, workers that expect to live longer in their old age would save more and 
leave less as bequests to children as a fraction of income. On the one hand, without 
any change in fertility, higher life expectancy reduces per child bequests as a fraction 
of income, and therefore, tends to increase fertility. However, when bequests per 
child fall, children’s middle-age consumption falls as a consequence and hence the 
marginal cost of a child rises and fertility may fall to offset higher marginal costs of a 
child in equation (3.15). The net effect of a higher tax rate for public health on 
fertility therefore depends on the relative strength of the taste for the welfare and 
number of children. When the taste for the number of children,  , is weaker but 
sufficiently close or equal to that for the welfare of children,   , i.e., when    or 
  , a rise in the tax rate for public health reduces fertility and hence raises both 
the capital and output per worker.  
 Let us now investigate the effects of tax rates for social security and public 
health on the provision of public health per worker, life expectancy, the ratio of 
middle-age consumption to income and the ratio of old-age consumption to income. 
 
Proposition 3.2. If   , then a rise in the tax rate for unfunded social security, T , 
raises  public health spending per worker, raises life expectancy, reduces the ratio of 
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middle-age consumption to income, and  reduces the ratio of old-age consumption to 
income.  If    ,  a rise in the tax rate for public health, M , raises public health 
spending per worker, raises life expectancy, reduces the ratio of middle-age 
consumption to income, and reduces the ratio of old-age consumption to income.  All 
those effects of a rise in M are also true when  . 
 
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix C. 
 In the conventional dynastic model without health spending, social security is 
neutral with regard to consumption pattern over life stages via saving, which is well 
known as the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis (Barro, 1974; Zhang, 1995). When 
public health is present in our model, however, social security increases public health 
spending per worker (and hence life expectancy as well), if the taste for the welfare of 
children is not weaker than the taste for the number of children. The effect of social 
security on public health spending per worker, and hence life expectancy, works 
through the effect of social security on fertility. As shown in Proposition 3.1, when 
the taste for the welfare of children,  , is not weaker than the taste for the number of 
children,  , a rise in the tax rate for social security reduces fertility, and hence 
increases public health spending per worker. With higher public health spending per 
worker, life expectancy increases, which leads to lower ratios of middle-age and old-
age consumption to income according to equations (3.17) and (3.20).  
There are both direct and indirect effects of a rise in the tax rate for public 
health on public health spending per worker. The direct effect is that when the tax rate 
for public health increases, so does public health spending per worker increases, 
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given any fertility level. The indirect effect of a rise in the tax rate for public health 
on public health spending per worker works through its effect on fertility.  As shown 
in Proposition 3.1, when the taste for the number of children is weaker but 
sufficiently close or equal to that for the welfare of children, i.e., when    or 
   , a rise in the tax rate for public health reduces fertility, and hence, increases 
public health spending per worker. Since both the direct and indirect effects of a rise 
in the tax rate for public health increase public health spending per worker, life 
expectancy increases. As a consequence, a rise in the tax rate for public health leads 
to lower ratio of both middle-age consumption to income and old-age consumption to 
income according to equations (3.17) and (3.20).  
Next, we turn to the impact of rises in tax rates for social security and public 
health on the fractions of middle-age earnings spent on savings and bequests. 
 
Proposition 3.3. A rise in the tax rate for unfunded social security, T , has no effect 
on the fraction of middle-age earnings spent on the sum of savings and 
bequests ( )bs  . Similarly, a rise in the tax rate for public health, M , also has no 
effect on the fraction of middle-age earnings spent on the sum of savings and 
bequests ( )bs  . 
 
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix C. 
A rise in the tax rate for social security has the following effects on bequests 
and savings: a higher tax rate for social security increases the burden of children in 
paying higher social security contributions and hence, altruistic parents leave more 
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bequests to children as in Barro (1974) and Zhang (1995). At the same time, parents 
expect to receive higher social security benefits and therefore, they tend to save less 
such that the fraction of middle-age earnings spent on the sum of savings and 
bequests ( )bs   is unaffected by social security. On the other hand, when the tax rate 
for public health increases, life expectancy increases, and hence, agents tend to save 
more for longer life in old age and leave less bequests to children. By doing so, the 
fraction of middle-age earnings spent on the sum of savings and bequests ( )bs   is 
also unaffected by the tax rate for public health. 
Since social security and public health can increase capital per worker and 
output per worker as indicated in Proposition 3.1, it is intuitive to state the following 
proposition: 
  
Proposition 3.4. If    , the total increase in capital per worker (output per 
worker) due to increases in tax rates for unfunded social security, T , and public 
health, M , is higher than the total increase in capital per worker (output per worker) 
due to an increase in only one of these two tax rates. The above results are also true 
when  . 
 
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix C.  
Proposition 3.1 implies that a tax rise for social security or public health 
increases capital per worker and output per worker if the taste for the number of 
children,  , is weaker but sufficiently close or equal to that for the welfare of 
children,  , i.e., if    or   . Then it is obvious that increases in tax rates for 
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both social security and public health generate a larger increase in capital per worker 
and output per worker than an increase in only one tax rate.  
 It is also interesting to compare the effects of a tax rise for social security on 
fertility, capital per worker and output per worker with those of a tax rise for public 
health on fertility, capital per worker and output per worker to explore which of the 
two tax policies, if used separately, is more effective in reducing fertility and raising 
both capital and output per worker. Proposition 3.5 summarizes the results: 
  
Proposition 3.5. If    , then the rate of decrease in fertility due to an increase in 
a tax rate for social security, T , is larger than  that due to an increase in a tax rate 
for public health, M . At the same time, the rate of increase in capital per worker and 
output per worker due to an increase in a tax rate for unfunded social security, T , is 
higher than the rate of increase in capital per worker and output per worker due to 
an increase in a tax rate for public health, M . The above results are also true 
when  .  
 
Proof. The proof is relegated to Appendix C.  
According to Proposition 3.5, if the taste for the number of children,  , is 
weaker but sufficiently close or equal to that for the welfare of children,  , i.e., if 
   or   , then the tax rate for social security has stronger negative effects on 
fertility, and hence, it has stronger positive effects on both capital and output per 
worker than the tax rate for public health. This implies that a rise in the tax rate for 
social security may be more effective in reducing fertility and increasing both capital 
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and output per worker than that for public health. The intuition is that a tax rise for 
social security imposes an additional cost component of a child in terms of forgone 
social security benefits of spending time rearing a child in equation (3.15), compared 
to a tax rise for public health. Therefore, social security exerts larger effects on 
fertility, capital per worker and output per worker than public health. The task next is 
to investigate how social security and public health affect welfare numerically with 
endogenous life expectancy and fertility.  
 
 3.4. Welfare implications through simulations 
Due to the complexity of tracking down the full dynamic path for a complete welfare 
analysis in this complicated model, we only focus on the steady state for the welfare 
analysis. Such a steady-state welfare analysis yields results corresponding to what is 
coined as the "modified golden rule of capital accumulation" in the conventional 
neoclassical growth model. At the steady state, the welfare level V  in (3.1) is given 
as follows: 
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
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where  , , ,c Y p n  are at their respective steady state levels and are functions of T  
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 We now investigate the optimal tax rates of social security and public health. 
We first differentiate the welfare function in (3.21) with respect to the tax rate for 
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23 By substituting 2 ( , )0 1( , ) /
T Ma MT Mp a a e       into the equation for fertility in (3.19), we obtain 
/n dn n n   . 
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The above first-order conditions implicitly determine the optimal tax rates of social 
security and public health in this complicated model. We next explore the 
implications of welfare in equation (3.21) using a numerical approach. 
The values of parameters are either in line with those in the literature if any 
(e.g., 0.65  , 0.25  ), or they are chosen to yield plausible values for fertility and 
the survival probability to old-age (e.g. 0.1v  , 0.5  , 0.5  , 0 0.95a  , 
1 0.45a  , 2 0.9a  , and 25A   ). Also, we set a low value for  at 0.01 that can 
generate realistic values for the tax rates. We later will examine whether the existence 
of positive investment externalities is essential for social security or public health to 
improve welfare by setting   at a zero level.  
 The numerical results show that the optimal tax rates for social security and 
public health are ( , ) (0.21,0.09)T M    as shown in Case 1 in Table 3.1 under the 
condition    . Given the parameterization, we can compare the implications of a 
tax rise in social security or public health on steady-state fertility, the ratio of middle-
age consumption to income, the ratio of old-age consumption to income, the 
provision of public health per worker, life expectancy, capital per worker, output per 
worker and the welfare level for cases with or without social security or public health 
in Table 3.1. Case 2 shows the numerical results when both social security and public 
health are absent. Case 3 investigates the effect of social security when public health 
is absent and Case 4 investigates the effect of public health when social security is 
absent. Finally, we investigate Case 5 in which both social security and public health 
are present.  
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Table 3.1 Simulation results with the condition     
Parameterization: 
0 1 20.95, 0.45, 0.9, 0.65, 0.5, 0.25, 0.5, 0.01, 25, 0.1a a a A v             
 
 n  c  d  M p K V  
1. Optimal rates      
0.21T  , 
0.09M   1.964 0.623 0.312 1.668 0.85 2.139 11.611 
    
2. 0T M    2.796 0.806 0.403 0 0.5 1.188 10.998 
    
3. 0, 0T M       
0.1T   2.509 0.806 0.403 0 0.5 1.431 11.043 
0.3T   1.775 0.806 0.403 0 0.5 2.511 11.074 
0.4T   1.297 0.806 0.403 0 0.5 4.063 11 
     
4. 0, 0M T        
0.05M   2.754 0.684 0.342 0.775 0.726 1.22 11.425 
0.1M   2.707 0.617 0.309 1.57 0.841 1.257 11.522 
0.15M   2.653 0.572 0.286 2.39 0.898 1.301 11.455 
    
5.   0T M       
0.05T M    2.606 0.682 0.341 0.807 0.732 1.342 11.46 
0.1T M    2.372 0.613 0.307 1.721 0.854 1.572 11.58 
0.2T M    1.703 0.532 0.266 4.212 0.94 2.679 11.271 
        
 
 
According to Proposition 3.1, the effects of a rise in the tax rate for social 
security or public health on fertility, capital per worker and output per worker depend 
on the relative strength between the taste for the welfare of children and that for the 
number of children. Table 3.1 illustrates that the rise in tax rates for social security or 
public health reduces fertility and raises capital per worker when the taste for the 
number of children is weaker but sufficiently close to the taste for the welfare of 
children i.e., when     .  
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Case 3 in Table 3.1 shows that when public health is absent, a rise in the tax 
rate for social security has no effect on the provision of public health per worker, life 
expectancy, the ratio of middle-age consumption to income and the ratio of old-age 
consumption to income. However, by comparing Case 3, Case 4 and Case 5 in Table 
3.1, a rise in the tax rate for social security raises the provision of public health per 
worker and life expectancy but reduces the ratio of middle-age consumption to 
income and the ratio of old-age consumption to income when public health is present. 
Case 4 in Table 3.1 also shows that a rise in the tax rate for public health raises the 
provision of public health per worker and life expectancy but reduces the ratio of 
middle-age consumption to income and the ratio of old-age consumption to income. 
These results are consistent with Proposition 3.2. 
Comparisons between Case 2, Case 3, Case 4 and Case 5 in Table 3.1 reflect 
Proposition 3.4 and Proposition 3.5. As shown in Table 3.1 for instance, 
when 0T M   , capital per worker is 1.188. When 0.1T M   , capital per 
worker increases to 1.572. Capital per worker at 1.572 is obviously higher than that at 
1.431 when 0.1T   and 0M  or at 1.257 when 0.1M   and 0T  . These results 
show that the increases in capital per worker and output per worker due to increases 
in both tax rates, T  and M , are higher than the increases in capital per worker and 
output per worker due to an increase in only one of these two tax rates, and hence 
these results are consistent with Proposition 3.4.  
By comparing Case 2, Case 3 and Case 4 in Table 3.1 for instance, it is also 
obvious that the rate of decrease in fertility by 2.87 when the tax rate for social 
security increases from 0T   to 0.1T   is larger than the rate of decrease in 
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fertility by 0.89 when the tax rate for public health increases from 0M   to 
0.1M  , and as a consequence, the rate of increase in capital per worker or output 
per worker due to an increase in the tax rate for social security is higher than that due 
to the same amount of increase in the tax rate for public health.  These results 
therefore reflect Proposition 3.5. 
The simulation results also indicate that social security or public health can 
increase welfare by reducing fertility and raising capital per worker when the taste for 
the number of children is weaker but sufficiently close or equal to the taste for the 
welfare of children. When both social security and public health are absent as in Case 
2, the welfare level is 10.998 in Table 3.1. By scaling up social security or public 
health, welfare increases and reaches the optimal level at 11.611 when 0.21T   and 
0.09M   in Table 3.1. This implies that it is more efficient when both social 
security and public health are implemented together rather than separately. The 
optimal per worker public expenditure on health, M , at 1.668 in Table 3.1 is about 
6% of the corresponding optimal output per worker at 25.856. The optimal per 
worker public expenditure on health at 6% of output per worker and the optimal tax 
rate for social security at 21% are close to the observed rates in industrial nations in 
which per capita public expenditure on health as a percentage of income per capita  
attains as high as around 8% (see World Health Statistics (2009)) and payroll tax rates 
for social security ranging from 10% to 20% or higher (see Social Security 
Administration and International Social Security Association (2006, 2008)).  
 In Table 3.2 we examine whether the simulation results concerning the 
optimal tax rates for social security and public health are sensitive to variations in the 
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parameters ( 0 1 2, , , , , , , , ,a a a A v     ) and to the existence of investment externalities 
by varying   from positive values to zero.24 In doing so, we consider variations in 
one parameter at a time, starting from the parameterization in Table 3.1. First, a 
higher value of the taste for the welfare of children ( ) yields a lower optimal tax 
rate of social security and the magnitudes of the changes in the optimal tax rate are 
large. This is because the more parents value their children’s welfare than the number 
of children, the smaller the efficiency loss of the investment externalities and 
therefore the lower the optimal social security. Second, a larger share parameter of 
capital ( ) leads to a higher optimal tax rate of social security and the magnitudes of 
the changes in the optimal tax rate are large as well. The reason for this result is that 
this share parameter measures the role of physical capital investment in the 
accumulation of physical capital. That is, with a larger share parameter , physical 
capital investment becomes more important in the production of output and therefore 
the efficiency loss of the physical capital externality is larger for a given degree of 
investment externality (  ). Third, a larger degree of investment externality also 
requires a higher optimal tax rate of social security due to a larger efficiency loss of 
the externality. Notice that the optimal tax rate of public health is insensitive to the 
variations in ,  or    . This is because the optimal tax rate of public health depends 
mainly on how it affects the provision of public health per worker and life expectancy 
which are less relevant for physical capital investment, which channels the efficiency 
loss of the investment externality. 
                                                 
24 The taste for the number of children,  , and the taste for the welfare of children,  , may change 
overtime due to cultural changes, government policies associated with children, increases in women’s 
education attainment and labor participation rates. 
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By contrast, variations in the other parameters produce relatively little 
changes in the optimal tax rate of social security and public health in Table 3.2. This 
is because these parameters are either less relevant for physical capital investment, 
which channels the efficiency loss of the human capital externality, than ( , , )   , or 
less relevant for the provision of public health per worker and life expectancy. 
It is worth mentioning that when the investment externality is absent ( =0), 
the optimal tax rates for social security and public health are still positive. This is 
because when individuals value old-age consumptions and social security benefits 
received in old-age, there are still potential roles taken up by tax rates of social 
security and public health in improving the provision of public health per worker and 
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Table 3.2 Simulated optimal tax rates: sensitivity analysis 
Parameter T  M  
Varying     
 =0.6 0.26 0.09 
 =0.7 0.17 0.09 
Varying     
  =0 0.18 0.09 
  =0.02 0.24 0.08 
Varying     
  =0.45 0.19 0.08 
  =0.55 0.23 0.09 
Varying     
  =0.2 0.16 0.09 
  =0.3 0.26 0.08 
Varying     
  =0.45 0.22 0.08 
  =0.55 0.2 0.09 
Varying 0a    
0a =0.9 0.21 0.09 
0a =1 0.21 0.09 
Varying 1a    
1a =0.4 0.21 0.08 
1a =0.5 0.21 0.09 
Varying 2a    
2a =0.85 0.21 0.09 
2a =0.95 0.2 0.09 
Varying A    
A =20 0.21 0.09 
A =30 0.2 0.09 
Varying v    
v  =0.05 0.21 0.11 




In this paper we have examined the implications of PAYG social security and 
public health for fertility, life expectancy, capital per worker, output per worker and 
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welfare in a dynastic model with altruistic bequest and endogenous fertility. We have 
shown analytically that if the taste for the welfare of children is not weaker than that 
for the number of children, scaling up social security reduces fertility, but raises 
capital per worker, output per worker, public health spending per worker and life 
expectancy. We have also shown analytically that if the taste for the number of 
children is weaker but sufficiently close or equal to that for the welfare of children, 
scaling up public health reduces fertility, but raises capital per worker, output per 
worker, public health spending per worker and life expectancy. A comparison of tax 
policies between social security and public health shows that social security may be 
more effective than public health in reducing fertility and raising both capital and 
output per worker when a tax rise for social security imposes an additional cost 
component of a child in terms of forgone social security benefits of spending time 
rearing a child compared to a tax rise for public health. Our simulation results 
reported in Tables 3.1 illustrate that scaling up social security or public health 
improves welfare by reducing fertility and raising capital intensity. Though social 
security and public health can be used separately to increase welfare, our simulation 
results show that the optimal welfare is reached when both social security and public 
health are implemented together. Our model can generate the optimal tax rate of 
social security at 21% and per worker public expenditure on health at 6% of output 
per worker at the same time. These optimal rates obtained jointly in this model are 
close to the observed rates for social security and per capita public expenditure on 
health as a percentage of per capita output in industrial nations. 
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The combination of such important factors as altruistic intergenerational 
transfers, and endogenous life expectancy and fertility has not been used together in 
exploring the implications of PAYG social security and public health for fertility, life 
expectancy, capital per worker, output per worker and welfare, to the best of our 
knowledge. Our results may have useful policy implications. Adopting both PAYG 
social security and public health may be appropriate for economies with high fertility, 
low life expectancy and low levels of capital per worker, output per worker and 
welfare. Our results also help to explain the popularity of PAYG social security and 
public health in developed economies. However, we recognize that private investment 
in both human capital and health may be relevant in exploring the welfare implication 
of social security when life expectancy and fertility are endogenous. This invites 
further research in this area.  
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Appendix C 
Proof of Proposition 3.1. First, we substitute 2 ( , )0 1( , ) /
T Ma MT Mp a a e       into the 
equation for fertility in (3.19) to obtain /n dn n n    as given in equation (3.23). We 
then differentiate /n dn n n    in (3.23) with respect to T  and obtain  
 
     21 1 2 2
2







      

                      (3.24) 
where  
  2 21 0 11 (1 ) e e 0a M a MM a a                 , 
  2 21 0 1e e 0a M a M a a         , 
 22 1 e 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )









      . 
Note that 2 > 0 if 1 (1 )T M        > 0 which is true if   . Using the 
transformed budget constraint in equation (3.11), 
 / (1 )( ) (1 )T Mc b b bs s               , and equation (3.13), 
( ) / (1 )bs      , we obtain  ( ) / 1 /(1 )T Mc b            . In 
addition, with positive fertility, the fertility equation in (3.15) implies c b   . Thus, 
if   ,  ( ) / 1 /(1 ) 0T Mc b              and 
(1 )(1 ) 0T M          . The condition (1 )(1 ) 0T M           
implies (1 )T M    > 0 which leads to 1 (1 )T M        > 0 and thus, 2 > 0. 
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By substituting / TM   into equation (3.24) and after rearranging equation 











   
     




1 ( ) 1 ( )
1 2 (1 )( ) 0a A
 
    

       ,  
 
1 1
1 ( ) 1 ( )
2
( )
1 ( ) 1 ( )
(1 )
1 ( )





   
  






   
 
   
      
       
 
  
Therefore, if  , then / Tn   <0 in equation (3.25). By equations (3.5) and (3.7),  
1 1/[1 ( )][ (1 ) / ]K A vn n      in the steady state, and hence if   , 
then / ( / )( / ) 0T TK K n n         .  By equation (3.4), 1(1 )Y AK vn      in the 
steady state, and with / 0TK     and / 0Tn    if   , we obtain 
/ ( / )( / ) ( / )( / ) 0T T TY Y K K Y n n               .   
Similarly, by differentiating /n dn n n    in (3.23) with respect to M , we 
obtain 
   22 1 2 2
2





v e a Mn
n
      

                    (3.26) 
where 
  2 22 0 1(1 ) e e 0a M a MT a a                 
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( ) 1
1 ( ) 1 ( )1
2
2




     
  
             
. 
By substituting / MM   into equation (3.26) and after rearranging equation (3.26), 
we obtain 
         
2
( ) 1
1 ( ) 1 ( )
2 1 2 1
2
1 2 2
(1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( )








        
     
  
                           (3.27) 
 
Note that if    , then the numerator of / Mn    is negative but the denominator 
of / Mn    is positive in equation (3.27). Therefore, if    , then / Mn   <0 in 
equation (3.27). As stated earlier, 1 1/[1 ( )][ (1 ) / ]K A vn n       and 
1(1 )Y AK vn     in the steady state. If    , we therefore obtain 
/ ( / )( / ) 0M MK K n n         , and  
/ ( / )( / ) ( / )( / ) 0M M MY Y K K Y n n               . It is obvious that the all the 
above results are also true for   .  
 
Proof of Proposition 3.2.  Recall that 
 
11 ( ) 1 1 ( )(1 ) (1 )MM A vn
n
 
     

              ,  
and 2 ( , )0 1( , ) /
T Ma MT Mp a a e      . By differentiating ( , )T Mp   with respect to T , 
we then obtain  
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 2 ( , )1 2
( , ) ( , )T MT M T Ma M
T T
p Ma a e      










      .  
By Proposition 3.1, if   , then / Tn   <0, and hence, / 0TM     and 
/ 0Tp    . Consequently, by equations (3.17) and (3.20), / 0Tc     
and / 0Td     when    .   
Similarly, by differentiating 2 ( , )0 1( , ) /
T Ma MT Mp a a e      with respect to M , 
we obtain 
 2 ( , )1 2
( , ) ( , )T MT M T Ma M
M M
p Ma a e      
     
where 
( ) 1
1 ( ) 1 ( )1
2
2







      
  
             
. 
By Proposition 3.1, if     or    , then / 0Mn    , and hence, 
/ 0MM     and / 0Mp    . By equations (3.17) and (3.20), we therefore obtain 
/ 0Mc     and / 0Md     if     or    .  
 
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Using equations (3.5) - (3.8), we can easily obtain 
 ( )
1b
s     .  
The claims follow through.  
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Proof of Proposition 3.4. Proposition 3.1 implies that if    or   , then 
/ 0TK     / 0MK    , / 0TY     and / 0MY    . Since 
1 1/[1 ( )][ (1 ) / ]K A vn n       in the steady state, by totally differentiating capital 
per worker, we obtain  
 T MT M
K KdK d d  
     
which is obviously greater than ( / ) , ,i idK K d i T M     , for 0, ,id i T M   .   
 By substituting 1 1/[1 ( )][ (1 ) / ]K A vn n      into 1(1 )Y AK vn     , we 
can rewrite output per worker as a function of tax rates for social security and public 
health: ( ( , ))T MY Y n   . Hence, by totally differentiating output per worker, we 
obtain   
 T MT M
Y YdY d d  
      
which is obviously greater than ( / ) , ,i idY Y d i T M     , for 0, ,id i T M   .  
 
Proof of Proposition 3.5. Proposition 3.1 implies that if    or   , then 
/ 0Tn     and / 0Mn    . If     or   , the sign for 




1 ( ) 1 ( )






   
 
   
  
   
      
               
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where 
  2 24 0 1e e (1 )(1 )a M a M T Ma a                   < 0 
 
Note that from the proof of proposition 3.1, (1 )(1 )T M          < 0 if   . 
With  / / 0T Msign n n       , we have / / 0T Mn n       . 
Since 1 1/[1 ( )][ (1 ) / ]K A vn n       in the steady state, by combining 
/ / 0T Mn n        with / 0K n    , we thus obtain 
T T M M
K K n K K n
n n   
             .   




1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( )( ) (1 )Y A n vn
   
       
  
           
and obviously, / 0Y n   . Therefore, we have 
 T T M M
Y Y n Y Y n
n n   
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